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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The worldwide wave of decentralization of the last two decades has been based on the 
assumption of the democratising, citizen-enabling, and efficient service-delivery potential of 
local governments. Local governments have not always delivered on their promise however, a 
fact that scholars and practitioners alike increasingly recognise. Efficiency has not always been 
accompanied by gains in accountability, and accountability has been frequently sacrificed to 
efficiency. In many contexts, local governments are neither efficient, not accountable to the local 
populations. Formal institutions that function well in some settings, in others, fall prey to the ills 
of mismanagement, corruption, patronage, and elite capture. And stellar performance in one 
policy field by no means guarantees excellence in others. A local authority might be a paragon of 
health services provision, but may dismally fail in addressing illiteracy. 
 
There is now a considerable body of literature on decentralization in diverse national contexts. 
Ascertaining factors that drive local accountability and performance have been the key concerns 
of these studies. Diverse methodological instruments and approaches have been used—from 
large-n statistical analyses to in-depth case study techniques. And yet, the findings regarding the 
drivers of local performance and accountability remain inconclusive or even contradictory even 
when different scholars employ similar data.  
 
The sheer vastness of the topic is the main reason for the ambivalence in research findings. Local 
governments operate in complex and variable locality-specific, national, regional, and even 
“global” environments. The locality-specific factors are among the most important drivers of 
local outcomes. They could be anything from the nature of local party structures, to a legacy of 
being a “company town” with a distorted economy, to high levels of ethno-social stratification, 
to the availability of natural resources, to a tradition of local civic engagement. An array of 
national factors may also impact on local governments’ ability to perform—such as whether a 
country is a democracy, whether it is an industrialized democracy, and what powers the national 
government chooses to cede to the local authorities. Regional factors might likewise affect local 
dynamics in various ways—from providing positive democracy demonstration effects, to 
generating economic shocks felt in local economies. And “global” factors operate not just at the 
level of multinationals setting up local office, but also in the sense of donors pursuing a 
decentralizing agenda and influencing local government set-up, policy, and service delivery 
instruments. 
  
Another reason for the ambivalence in findings is the difficulty of distinguishing performance 
from accountability. For the sake of clarity, in this review performance refers to effectiveness in 
providing and/or delivering services to the local populations and addressing broader social needs. 
Accountability refers to constraints on public officials by the local citizenry. A discussion of how 
these terms are generally used in the literature follows. 
 
Few studies offer precise definitions of local performance. This reflects the complexity and 
multidimensionality of this concept. In the best-known study of performance, Putnam (Putnam 
1993) conceptualises it as incorporating societal demands which lead to political interaction with 
government, which affects policy choice, and finally leads to policy implementation. According 
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to Putnam, “a high performance democratic institution must be both responsive and effective: 
sensitive to the demands of its constituents and effective in using limited resources to address 
those demands” (Putnam 1993: 9). Another well-known study employs the term “effective local 
governance.” It refers to “exist[ence] [of] working systems of collective action that manage a 
locality’s public affairs that are accountable to local residents” (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004: 
1). In their widely cited work on local government in South Asia and Africa, Crook and Manor 
do not provide a concise definition of performance. They use a range of indicators and measures 
of performance, such as output effectiveness related to local policy and services; responsiveness, 
defined as “the degree of congruence between policies, outputs and popular preferences”; and 
process, which refers to transparency, fairness of local officials, etc (Crook and Manor 1998: 18). 
The above definitions suggest that performance is used very widely, and incorporates both the 
various dimensions of service and policy effectiveness, and accountability. 
 
That accountability could be sometimes in conflict with performance (as defined by the author of 
the review) is not always acknowledged by scholars because of the usage of both of these terms 
as proxies for wider performance outcomes. Below are some examples of how effectiveness/ 
performance could be in conflict with the goals of accountability. Accountability has been 
referred to as “constraints on the rent-seeking activities of office holders, such as diverting rents 
from the public purse, taking bribes, favouring of particular interest groups, and insufficient 
innovation and effort” (Hindriks and Lockwood 2005: 2). Technical skills, which are important 
for performance, are not reflected in this definition. And yet, however much “effort” the local 
councillors make, they may simply lack the skills to manage a local hospital. They may be 
“innovative” enough to outsource its operation to a private company. But then accountability 
would be partially sacrificed, as the local public would not be able to hold the company in 
question directly accountable. Moreover, as Putnam indicates, public officials may not always 
anticipate what the public had not yet articulated. At the same time, outcomes of policy decision 
making would not match the preferences of its proponents however well government action 
might be designed and implemented (Putnam 1993). It may be difficult to achieve 
responsiveness, accountability, and sound service delivery performance, at the same time. 
 
Accordingly, performance is often used in reference to structures of democratic accountability, 
such as election or oversight. In many studies service delivery outputs, which could be shaped—
positively or negatively by accountability mechanisms, but not solely by them—are often 
overlooked however. In fact, many studies do not even go into any great lengths to investigate 
specific policy areas. 
 
That often the outcome is either-or, rather than both, in the sense of efficiency versus 
accountability, is a source of enormous frustration for advocates of decentralization. The reasons 
for this tension are well known. The essential services that local governments perform are also 
often incredibly complex ones. The most notable among them are education and primary 
healthcare.1 These services require economies of scale, standartization, and a high level of 
technical skills and expertise. Inevitably, the national government or sub-national state 
bureaucracies retain partial authority over these services, or chose to outsource them to private 
bodies or NGOs. This generates tension between the normative goals of downward 
                                                 
1 It covers a host of services from nutrition, to sanitation, to information and education, as well as curative care in 
clinics (Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000) 
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accountability of local governments, and efficiency. The balance between accountability and 
performance could be a delicate one.2  
  
This paper attempts to tie the various strands of literature together to ascertain the main drivers 
of local performance and accountability. It explores accountability and performance in the 
context of a whole range of factors, such as enabling environment of national regulations; donor 
projects; ability of councillors to mobilize government; powers and skills of councillors; their 
ideologies; fear of sanctions; cultural norms and values. It also examines in greater depth the 
main arguments that have been advanced regarding the tension between accountability and 
performance or efficiency. While some of the drivers of local performance discussed in this 
review, such as fiscal decentralization, have already received extensive treatment in the literature 
on local performance, others, such as party systems and neighbourhood factors, have been 
subject to less empirical treatment. 
    
The paper has three main sections. Section one is a survey of the literature on key factors that 
shape local government performance. In particular, in the sub-sections, the following factors are 
highlighted: (1) democracy and rule of law; (2) voice through elections and oversight; (3) socio-
economic development; (4) political culture and tradition; (5) corruption; (6) ethnic diversity 
and fragmentation; (7) role of national and local party systems and politics; (8) appropriate 
policy sphere to decentralize; (9) fiscal decentralization and access to capital markets; (10) the 
structure of local government and lines of accountability; (11) size of the local government unit; 
(12) outsourcing; (13) leadership skills; (14) role of broader geographic factors and impact of 
donors. In each of the sub-sections key or representative studies are cited, and the merits or 
weaknesses of their methodological approaches and interpretations, as well as data needs and 
limitations, are discussed. Where appropriate, best practice cases are also discussed. Section two 
critically assesses in more detail the main methodological approaches that have been employed 
for measuring and evaluating performance, such as public opinion customer satisfaction-type 
surveys, interviews with key local respondents, and small- and large-n studies using indicators of 
local outputs and outcomes. The discussion in the third section summarises the key patterns 
regarding the drivers of local performance that emerge from the literature review, and, based on 
it, comes up with a list of hypotheses and research questions. 
                                                 
2 Much of the recent literature on decentralization also underestimates the complexity of the “black box” of policy 
making and implementation, which is often far removed from normative ideals of democratic accountability and 
efficiency (John 1998).  
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The Drivers of Local Performance 
 
 
DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW 
 
A key factor identified in comparative studies of local government performance and 
accountability is the role of the broader national political and legal environment in which local 
government reform takes place and in which local governments operate. This point might appear 
obvious however advocates of decentralization have not accorded it sufficient prominence. Local 
governments in many studies and policy advocacy papers are assumed to operate in isolation 
from broader national environments. As Heller et al. remark, the literature that focuses on the 
“vast underside of local political life . . . usually pays scant attention to the larger institutional 
context” (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). Another underlying assumption of many studies 
is that even where the broader environments are not democratic, setting up popularly elected 
local governments would help democratise the polity as a whole.   
 
The jury is still out on the question of whether democracy and the existence of an accountable 
and responsive national government is an essential precondition for successful decentralization 
(Shah); or whether setting up elected local governments would lead to a virtuous cycle of 
accountability, responsiveness, and good performance, in the polity as a whole. Recent 
comparative studies have shown that pre-existing levels of democracy may strongly affect the 
potential of local governments to deliver on their normative promise (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 
2004). Absent a tradition of democracy, decentralizing power to the localities might even have 
harmful effects on local performance. 
 
Other studies have suggested that even in countries that were not consolidated democracies at the 
outset of decentralization, as democracy matures, there would be gradual advancements in 
democratic accountability at a local level. Clientelistic systems emerge where political 
competitors are not credible and promises become credible only to “clients,” and less is spent on 
public goods. In more mature democracies, politicians will have already increased their 
credibility by rewarding clients on a targeted basis, and by gradually expanding their client base. 
Clientelism subsides when reputations for broader public services provision extending beyond 
the narrow client base develop (Ahmad et al. 2005). This of course takes time, and extends well 
below one electoral cycle. 
 
Even in the short term there may be a positive link between decentralization and democratic 
performance in newly democratizing settings (Huther and Shah 1998). Theoretical modelling of 
the impact of centralised versus decentralised systems on electoral accountability supports this 
claim. In centralised systems, there is arguably a higher probability of diverting rents in some 
regions without voters in other localities detecting this (Hindriks and Lockwood 2005). 
Decentralization serves as a corrective to such structures of misallocation, ultimately affecting 
democracy in the country as a whole. Another study that modelled the relative likelihood of 
interest group capture at lower versus higher government levels suggested that there may be a 
tendency for less capture at lower levels of authority, but the extent would be highly context-
specific (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000). Finally, Seabright’s model supports the argument that 
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decentralization might increase accountability for a given region. Within a given region however 
accountability for certain localities, such as those that are insufficiently homogenous and whose 
interests show greater cohesiveness at a national level, could still be compromised (Seabright 
1996). 
 
Even in countries with democratic institutions and elections in place, weak rule of law could 
hamper efforts to build accountable and effective local governments. Rule of law has been 
defined as the extent to which citizens have “confidence in and abide by the rules of society” 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 2002). A transparent and functioning legal system with 
predictable judiciary is essential for local government oversight. It also helps prevent abuse of 
state power against elected local governments or their executive bodies. Where the judiciary is 
not independent, a strong degree of arbitrariness is likely in state monitoring and supervision of 
local governments. Local governments might get penalised or legal proceedings might be 
initiated against local mayors based on political factors, and not on actual mismanagement or 
other local government performance weaknesses. In such systems, fear of sanctions forces local 
governments to act based on the preferences of higher administrative or political authorities, and 
not those of local citizens (Lankina 2004). 
 
Rule of law also affects evaluation capacity and scrutiny, which are considered key to effective 
performance. A legal environment that allows civic associations, think tanks, the press, and other 
formal and informal institutions that foster critical thought, to thrive, is essential for scrutiny and 
oversight. The independence of the media in particular is increasingly recognised as a key 
mechanism for holding power holders accountable, and is included as an important indicator in 
aggregate indicators of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 2002; Azfar, 
Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001). Only in democratic systems with strong mechanisms for 
“voice” and “exit” (Hirschman 1970) via the ballot box, and an environment for the functioning 
of such independent organizations, is evaluation, and by extension, effective and accountable 
governance, possible. This may not be true in many “adjectival” democracies (Collier and 
Levitsky 1997). The local media may not be of sufficiently high quality to scrutinise local public 
services effectively (Ahmad et al.). In some developing countries, mass media at a local level are 
“virtually nonexistent” (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004). In Russian localities, the key local 
newspaper is often produced and controlled by the local governments themselves, defeating the 
purpose of effective scrutiny (Lankina 2004). Where targeted measures had been introduced 
specifically publicising local government expenditures through radio or other media, they have 
had a positive impact. In Uganda, they helped prevent public funds misuse (Khemani 2004). In 
West Bengal, efforts to publicise and report on poorly-performing local public sector doctors and 
nurses or those who discriminated between patients resulted in improved performance (Filmer, 
Hammer, and Pritchett 2000). 
 
While there is a growing body of case studies on the impacts of broader democratic 
environments on performance, data limitations hamper efforts at cross-national comparisons 
(Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). Because of these limitations, most of the cross-national 
studies deal with the links between broader variables of democracy and rule of law and 
decentralization/ local performance. Where cross-national research using such broader variables 
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has been conducted, endogeneity is often a problem (Dreher 2006).3 Missing data on a key set of 
developing countries, such as those in Africa, make questionable the findings of cross-national 
comparative studies that link decentralization to democratic performance (Huther and Shah 
1998). Moreover, scholars do not always include sound controls, providing simple bivariate 
correlations between local government/ decentralization and indicators of governance, 
accountability, and democracy (Shah; Huther and Shah 1998). 
 
VOICE THROUGH ELECTIONS AND OVERSIGHT 
 
Traditionally, accountability mechanisms in many settings were hierarchical and bureaucratic in 
nature. They ranged from inspectorates, to central government approval of local staff and 
decision making, to codes of conduct and disciplinary mechanisms. By contrast, bottom-up 
mechanisms of scrutiny and oversight would be based upon the principles of the threat of “exit,” 
and the exercise of “voice” through elections (Hirschman 1970). Scholars have argued that in the 
real world, exit is not always possible (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). They caution against 
the application of the concept of exit without regard for the peculiarities of specific local and 
national contexts. In less developed settings, the poor often lack resources for transportation and 
relocation to other areas. They cannot vote with their feet in a way that affluent middle-class 
residents would, for example, in America. Mobility is often not the preferred option because of 
cultural, social, or ethnic ties to a particular locale or community. Local residents, even if they 
are unsatisfied with public services, may therefore choose the option of “loyalty,” i.e., staying 
where they live. Exit in the sense of changing service providers may be also not possible under 
all circumstances, for example, where alternative private providing structures are undeveloped. 
Exit may not be relevant for some key policy areas, such as the environment (Olowu 2003). If 
we extend Hirschman’s application of the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty, we would expect 
that in such circumstances, voice may be the key instrument of oversight and accountability 
(Hirschman 1970; Gangopadhyay and Nath 2001). Moreover, it would be also exercised more 
vigorously as compared to situations when exit is not an option. 
 
Elections, which are considered to be the central element of democratic local governance, 
provide the most straightforward channel for the exercise of these citizen rights of voice. In 
democratic theory, elections are assumed to legitimize local authority and provide elected 
representatives with a mandate for action. They also serve as key means of ensuring public 
accountability. Accountability could be attained through voting incumbents out of office or 
demanding regular accounts of actions and policies.  
 
Contrary to expectations, even where effective exit is not possible, and where a democratic 
electoral process is in place, elections do not always serve as effective mechanisms of voice 
however. Evidence from various settings suggests that a host of factors may shape the 
effectiveness of elections as local citizen voice. Key among them are whether candidates run as 
                                                 
3 Dreher for example used such measures as the PRS Group International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) law and order 
indicator; the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index for measures of judicial independence; and the World 
Bank Rule of Law Index covering perceptions of governance, to measure the impact of decentralization on 
governance variables. While some of these proxies have time series variation, they could still be construed as 
affecting decentralization, rather than as decentralization affecting performance. (Dreher 2006). 
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independents or on a party ticket; whether officials that are being elected are perceived to wield 
sufficient power; whether local elections are held concomitantly with national elections; and 
whether electoral manipulations occur (Sisk 2001). 
 
An established body of literature on Western local governance also suggests that even under 
“perfect” conditions of free and fair elections and the existence of a wider stable democratic 
national context, voice in local elections may fail to ensure that elected officials will exercise 
power on behalf of all of their constituencies. In his classic study of community power in 
America, Hunter showed how in American cities, power is exercised by a narrow elite (Hunter 
1953). This and other studies showed how the involvement of non-elite segments of the 
community is often limited to endorsing decisions already reached by these other interests 
(Schattschneider 1960; Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Studies from various western settings, such 
as France, England, and America, also show the middle-class, white-collar, male bias in the 
composition of many elected bodies (Balme 1989; Newton 1976; Mabileau 1989; Mabileau et al. 
1989; Mabileau 1995; Stone 1989) . This suggests that structural biases against marginalized and 
non-elite groups are built into elections even in democratic settings.  
 
Two other classic studies of American local governance provide more nuanced explanations of 
why voice could be still effective even under conditions of asymmetries in access to power. 
Dahl’s study of New Haven suggests that elite over-representation in local decision making may 
not mean that non-elite interests are not taken into account. And Stone’s dissection of power in 
local governance in Atlanta suggests that in a democracy, non-elite groups voluntarily delegate 
power to, and elect, those better endowed than themselves. This is because the elites have more 
resources, time, skills, and capital to govern (Dahl 1966; Stone 1989). 
 
Contemporary decentralization advocates do not always give proper consideration to these rich 
and nuanced decades’-long debates on local electoral processes and politics. This is particularly 
evident with the way in which the concept of “downward accountability” has been recently 
promoted and used, particularly by the donor community as it pursues a decentralization agenda 
in developing settings. In a recent article critical of the faddism involved in promoting this 
concept, Rubin deconstructs “downward” accountability using the examples of American local, 
state, and national government (Rubin 2005). He argues that elections do not provide the kinds 
of accountability that its advocates envisage. Incumbents are hard to remove from office 
however bad their performance; the local public is often uninformed on matters that are technical 
in nature; and the representation function of elections is undermined because voters vote for 
people from their ethnic group or simply based on subjective sympathies for the candidate. 
Moreover, citizens are usually presented with only a few candidate choices, which means that “a 
multitude of issues must map into a small decision set” (Rubin 2005: 2079). “Apocalyptic levels 
of ignorance” (Rubin 2005: 2079) also sometimes characterise the average voter, and this, in 
established Western democracies where access to education and information is as high as it gets. 
Assigning more functions to elected authorities, rather than to administrative agencies, does not 
mean that the citizenry would closely monitor them: policies are too “fine-grained” to become 
issues in an electoral campaign (Rubin 2005: 2080).  
 
Empirical evidence from developing democracies confirms that citizen voice through elections 
does not always ensure effective representation, aggregation, and articulation of broad-based 
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interests in local councils. Gangopadhyay and Nath found this to be the case in India’s 
metropolises of Calcutta, Delhi, and Bombay. Using the example of local expenditure decisions 
they show that citizen voter preferences were not reflected in local expenditure decisions, instead 
favouring the rich and middle-income groups (Gangopadhyay and Nath 2001). Short of specific 
targeted measures to mitigate the anti-poor biases in local decision making, such asymmetries are 
likely to persist, they argue. Another comprehensive study likewise observed this paradox of lack 
of citizen vigilance through elections in African settings. Even where elections are in place, local 
citizens fail to effectively sanction poorly performing officials. They often even fail to inform 
themselves of local decision making (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001).  
 
Generally, even in Western democracies there has been a decline of faith in such traditional 
instruments of representative democracy as elections. In some countries, turnouts in local 
elections have also gradually gone down over the last few decades. Elections focused on parties 
have likewise alienated the voter, as parties—another traditional institution in a democracy—are 
often perceived to have lost touch with the electorate. In Canada, parties are excluded from 
elections in cities with less than 20,000 voters because party formation is perceived to be 
detrimental to local democracy and governance at smaller levels of authority. It is assumed that 
party-free elections ensure that mayors and other elected officials speak on behalf of the 
community as whole, and do not pursue narrow party agenda (Sisk 2001). 
 
In order to address the issue of alienation of the voter from elected representatives, additional 
formal mechanisms for influencing elected officials between elections have also been put in 
place. Once such mechanism is recall by constituents. Examples from developing countries are 
Nigeria and Ethiopia, as well as some Indian states, like Madhya Pradesh (Mathew and Mathew 
2003). Such other mechanisms are important because elections may serve as a highly imperfect 
mechanism of accountability. This would be particularly true in settings where “money, 
violence, and corruption” dominate them, and where politics are personalistic, kin-focused, or 
patronage based (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004: 71).  
 
The perceived inadequacy of elections as a mechanism of voice and accountability in various 
settings has spurred a variety of complementary formal and informal mechanisms and practices 
for the exercise of citizen voice. These mechanisms have been referred to as enhanced 
participation, complementing traditional forms of participation. Decentralization advocates have 
hailed the potential of such forums for reinvigorating local politics, citizen activism, and 
accountability. In contrast to elections, which represent indirect forms of democracy, these 
mechanisms are forms of direct democracy involving a strong deliberative component. 
Logistically, some of these deliberative forums could be complicated and time consuming 
however, they may have merits. Consensus-based decision making may be more legitimate 
compared to when elected officials take decisions independently and could not be realistically 
scrutinised on a daily basis (Sisk 2001). 
 
The practical form of these participatory practices and arrangements could range from public 
meetings, to citizen juries, to forums for various social groups, such as the young or the elderly, 
to neighbourhood assemblies, to multi-choice referendums which are accompanied by active 
public debate and discussions, to NGO and other community activism. In some settings, 
experiments were held whereby citizens were exempted from work and asked to meet to make 
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recommendations about local issues. This has arguably had the effect of drawing even the 
normally passive and disinterested citizens into public life and activism. Size of the locality and 
its cohesiveness are important factors that determine the effectiveness of such forums (Sisk 
2001).  
           
Examples of the application of direct voice in developing settings are participatory budgeting 
practices. These practices originated in Latin American cities, the best-known case being Porto 
Alegro. Participatory budgeting is based on public discussion of budgeting decisions, which then 
become binding on the council (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004). In India, the Gram Sabha, or 
a village assembly of all voters that is not elected, but is held at some periodic interval, is another 
potential mechanism of direct participation and regular scrutiny of public officials. However, the 
performance record of these forums in some countries is mixed: some studies report low levels 
of participation and frequent lack of a quorum. At the same time, such public assemblies risk 
becoming too “large and unwieldy for any effective participation” (Mathew and Mathew 2003): 
26). Recently, in India, adjustments have been made based on early experiences with the Gram 
Sabha. Large states like Orissa, West Bengal, Kerala, and Madhya Pradesh opted for Gram 
Sabhas of smaller territorial coverage. This helps overcome the issue of the poor lacking funds to 
travel to participate in these meetings (Mathew and Mathew 2003). 
 
Civic groups could also monitor local decisions. An example is the social audit in India, whereby 
committees composed of individuals with impeccable reputations scrutinise local decision 
making and publicise findings on how public moneys are allocated and spent. Public hearings of 
corruption cases, accompanied by wide publicity and social mobilization is another important 
mechanism in place in some states like Rajasthan. The experience in this state has been quite 
positive. There is evidence that officials return public moneys that they had misallocated as a 
result of the hearings. In Kerala, vigilance committees have been also effective at a ward level 
(Mathew and Mathew 2003). 
 
Service delivery surveys represent alternative possibilities of oversight. They have been in place 
in Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, Malaysia, and India. Another example of social scrutiny of local 
governments is social funds committees. These are user groups that ensure that services are 
delivered as intended. The empirical record of these mechanisms is mixed and no systematic 
scholarship exists as to their effectiveness however (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004).  
 
Ombudsmen for citizens to report local grievances against officials represent another potential 
check on power abuse by local authorities. Evidence from Africa indicates however that their 
effectiveness is considered lower than that of mass media or other vehicles for publicising and 
scrutinising abuse (Olowu et al.). Mathew and Mathew by contrast cite the positive example of 
Kerala. The office of the Ombudsman is a seven-member body consisting of a High Court Judge 
as the Chairperson, other judges, and non-political representatives appointed after consultation 
with opposition parties. Appelate tribunals also exist as a source of appeal against panchayat 
decisions. Only impeachment could remove members of these bodies, which is aimed at 
minimising the chance of executive interference with their work (Mathew and Mathew 2003). 
Likewise, in some African countries such as Ghana and Uganda, local judicial or conflict-
resolving agencies, which may be customary in nature, arguably provide redress for local 
grievances (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004).  
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Another related contextual factor affecting local performance is the level of social and economic 
development of the localities and polity as a whole. Normative ideas about local government are 
derived from industrialised nations with high levels of economic development (Litvack, Ahmad, 
and Bird 1998). Data compiled by international agencies show a link between social and 
economic development, decentralization, and local government performance. Relatively high 
levels of economic development might facilitate local government performance. Decentralization 
might have the reverse impact in less developed countries, and would be more prone to elite 
capture or patronage (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). 
  
Scholars are only now beginning to ascertain precisely how poverty, democracy, and low local 
government performance could go together. Poor people are not as capable as those that are 
better off to hold politicians accountable even if democratically elected councils are in place. 
Information asymmetries could be an important reason for a lack of exercise of voice. Disparities 
in political awareness levels could be marked among various classes, hence the greater likelihood 
of interest group capture the higher the levels of illiteracy, poverty, and inequality (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2000). Poor people might also lack the resources to travel to remote government or 
other agencies to exercise their right to participate (Agraval and Gupta 2005; Ahmad et al. 2005).  
 
So, even if participatory mechanisms might be in place boosting a given locality’s overall 
economic development, the levels of participation within the community are likely to be lower 
among those less economically advantaged. Benefits from new participatory arrangements may 
be biased towards those who are better off. For instance, a study of Uganda found that education 
levels and income were determinants of membership of citizens in such key local government 
committees as health and school management (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001).4 
Agraval and Gupta found similar patterns with respect to the governance of common pool 
resources in Nepal (Agraval and Gupta 2005). And in India, Crook and Manor found that 
decentralization did not always empower the lower castes or women. While these groups showed 
high levels of participation in elections, they reported being marginalised in local decision 
making. Funds specifically allocated for Scheduled Castes also did not always reach these 
traditionally marginalised groups and were used for other purposes (Crook and Manor 1998). 
 
This record has led some scholars to conclude that where communities are already highly 
stratified along the lines of power, income, wealth, and social status, decentralization might only 
exacerbate extant levels of socio-economic inequality. Accordingly, decentralization programs 
ought to be biased (emphasis original) towards disadvantaged groups, rather than being formally 
neutral in their design and implementation (Agraval and Gupta 2005). By contrast, localities with 
lower levels of socio-economic inequalities might benefit from decentralization even in 
developing settings. Heller, et al. found this to be the case in India’s state of Kerela. Here land 
reforms preceded decentralization, and there is a more equal class structure than in most other 
parts of India. The campaign to devolve authority to the Panchayats led to increased levels of 
performance, accountability, and participation of a diverse social strata, including members of 
disadvantaged groups (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). Economic modelling has shown 
that this conclusion might hold in other settings as well. Decentralization may raise capture in 
                                                 
4 This finding did not hold in the Philippines. 
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high-inequality districts, while lowering it in low-inequality ones (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2000). 
 
Other scholars suggest that the causal mechanisms could go both ways however. Good 
governance might increase per capita incomes, and incomes in turn increase the demand for 
better governance and accountability (Huther and Shah 1998). There are also more specific links 
between public expenditures and the reduction of socio-economic inequalities that are related to 
structures of democratic/ electoral accountability. Foster and Rosenzweig assembled a twenty-
year panel dataset from 250 villages in Rural India to determine how democratic local 
governance affects public goods provision to the poor. They found that in villages with 
democratic governance, i.e., those with an elected panchayat, higher proportions of the landless 
poor increased the likelihood of allocation of funds for road construction, which provides jobs 
for these groups. It also lowered the proportion of local spending for irrigation, which usually 
benefits the landed rural elite (Foster and Rosenzweig 2004). The results do not hold for 
localities with a “non-democratic governance system.” Their findings point to possible longer-
term impacts of local governments on reducing rural income inequalities and elite capture. Still, 
they admit that their findings also point to questions of efficiency in resource allocation and 
possible over-investment into one asset area at the expense of others, such as irrigation.   
  
POLITICAL CULTURE AND TRADITION 
 
Another set of factors could be broadly labelled political culture and tradition. Countries vary in 
their broader patterns of attitudes to political authority and participation; alternatively there may 
also be within-nation variations in political culture patterns depending on the locality we are 
investigating. Political culture and tradition might have a strong bearing on how public resources 
are allocated, and how politicians and officials are held accountable (Almond and Verba 1989; 
Banfield and Wilson 1963; Banfield 1958; Eckstein 1998; Putnam 1993; Diamond 1999; Fox, 
Clark, and Treakle 2003).  
 
Social capital, which refers to strength of associational ties and civic engagement, has become a 
particularly influential concept in studies of local governance following the publication of 
Putnam’s study of local performance in Italian regions. Social capital might shape institutional 
performance, but institutional design might also alter social norms and practices (Putnam 1993). 
This premise has been tested in cross-national studies of decentralization and local performance. 
According to an IMF Working Paper fiscal decentralization could stimulate the development of 
social capital. An increase in the size of sub-national governments and their share in total 
government spending are positively associated with confidence in government, greater civic 
cooperation, and associational activity.5 This finding supports the contention of local government 
advocates that when expenditure assignments are closer to revenue sources and the electorate, 
there is greater policy accountability and transparency. Such a proximity of the government to 
the electorate in turn generates greater levels of enforcement of social contracts, participation, 
engagement, and responsibility for local decision making, ultimately boosting local social 
                                                 
5 The finding was largely robust to the inclusion of several controls, such as ethnic fragmentation, public debt as a 
share of GDP, age-dependency ration, UNDP Human Development Index; TI Index of corruption; gini coefficient of 
income inequality; and status of being a developing country.  
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capital. This contrasts with arrangements with more “distant” governments, which are 
mistrusted, and which create weak incentives for cooperative problem solving. As with other 
studies, the possible problem of endogeneity is acknowledged in the paper, particularly given the 
level of aggregation of the data (de Mello 2000). 
 
Going beyond a focus on political culture and social capital, other scholars have proposed to 
distinguish countries along a broader set of cultural-historical criteria and identify those which 
might be conducive to, or inhibit, good local government performance. Drawing on Max Weber, 
Hutchcroft distinguishes between polities with bureaucratic administrative and governance 
features from those that are patrimonial. Local government performance is likely to fall victim to 
local informal practices in the latter type of settings however good the formal institutional design 
might be. “Where local bosses wield substantial coercive power, devolution may end up 
promoting forces hostile to democracy,” he writes. Moreover, “developmental objectives may be 
hindered by programs that merely end up strengthening those who already monopolize local 
resources—and the central government may be the only institution in the entire country able to 
democratize access to resources at the local level” (Hutchcroft 2001: 42).  
 
Settings with strong traditional authorities have been singled out in particular for presenting a 
challenge to current decentralization agenda. Scholars document how traditional or customary 
authorities, such as chiefs, kings, and religious leaders, have been reasserting their power in 
many African countries. In other settings too, such as Guatemala, Indonesia, and China there is 
evidence that traditional authorities continue to wield substantial power over local citizens. 
These figures see decentralization as a challenge to their authority as new actors and institutions 
get empowered. Their response has been often to sabotage or otherwise influence the 
decentralization agenda to their advantage. Ribot writes how in the context of a discourse on 
sustainability and development, they also successfully use the language of authenticity for their 
own ends, presenting themselves as true spokesmen of community interests (Ribot 2004). Even 
where broadly representative elected local authorities exist, such traditional figures often act as 
intermediaries between elected councils and villagers. At issue here is not so much the strength 
of these authorities as compared to elected local governments; rather, it is the fact that donors 
and governments often chose to act through these figures, and not local elected bodies. This 
“politics of choice and recognition” also has profound distributional impacts, as resources get 
channelled through non-elected bodies, while local governments are sidelined (Ribot 2007; 
Ntsebeza 2004; Ribot 2004). Corruption and mismanagement may be an outcome of such 
practices of work through customary authorities because they could not be held publicly 
accountable (Ntsebeza 2004). Accountability also becomes problematic in such situations as it is 
not based on systematic institutional mechanisms, but on personalities, beliefs, culture, and 
tradition (Ribot 2004).     
 
According to other scholars, indigenous cultural patterns of rule based on such authorities could 
be in fact more conducive to effective local governance than formal institutions borrowed from 
western templates. Some scholars have warned against simplistic institutional engineering 
solutions, such as those aimed at creating “modern” European- or American-modelled local 
government units that seek to do away with customary modes of governance. As Olowu et. al 
write, customary authorities have been important as alternative sources of local governance in 
the context of wider state weak capacity or even collapse, such as in Zaire and Somalia. In 
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Mozambique, Ribot cites a study describing chiefs as progressive. In the context of a weak civil 
society they arguably represent legitimate forces in the community (Ribot 2004). Externally-
imposed institutions might have weak social roots. While traditional authorities like chiefs, 
whose power may have been reinforced through colonial policies, lack democratic accountability 
(Ribot 2004; Ntsebeza 2004; Ribot; Mamdani 1997), in some communities they may be 
genuinely respected. They can play important roles in the strengthening of formal institutions of 
local government (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004).   
Corruption 
Corruption is an entrenched feature of public administration in many countries (Azfar, 
Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001). Some studies suggest that fiscal decentralization may reduce 
corruption because bringing spending down to the local level of authority improves the 
possibility of citizen check on local officials. Increasing the number of elected local authorities 
may also reduce the level of corruption, as arguably local services generate fewer stakes and are 
less cost-intensive than large national government projects (Fisman and Gatti 2002).  
 
Other scholars have shown causal links between the volume of bureaucracies and increased 
levels of corruption. In his cross-national study of decentralization and the quality of government 
in 166 countries Treisman found that states with more tiers of government tend to have greater 
perceived levels of corruption. They also have less effective public healthcare and infrastructure 
provision (Treisman 2002). This supports the findings of another scholar who used Treisman’s 
data and found a link between the number of sub-national tiers and higher costs for starting a 
business, which could be considered as a proxy for corruption (Dreher 2006). Studies of 
individual countries like Bolivia found that decentralization and the setting up of ostensibly 
accountable local bodies was characterised by particularistic distribution of public resources. The 
Bolivian example is instructive, as it is one of the most corrupt countries according the 
Transparency International index of corruption. As some scholars have put it, in Bolivia, rather 
than being reduced, corruption has been “democratised” as a result of decentralization (Altman 
and Lalander 2003: 85). 
 
Possible explanations for the links between local governments and corruption are 
straightforward. Proliferation of local government units increases the numbers of public officials. 
In settings with already high levels of corruption this multiplies the levels at which the use of 
public office for private gain is possible. Corruption could be even more vicious at a local level. 
This is because public and media scrutiny might not be so intense at a local level compared to the 
national one. Moreover, intimate familiarity with local constituencies, which is more likely at a 
smaller scale, increases the potential for patron-client relationships with local interest or other 
groups (Prud'homme 1995; Treisman 2002). Finally, greater levels of discretion of local officials 
may increase, rather than decrease levels of corruption (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001). 
This finding contradicts the normative assumption of greater local discretion as more beneficial 
for local accountability. 
 
Ultimately, the transposing of corruption from higher to lower levels of authority subverts local 
developmental objectives and could even exacerbate extant socio-economic problems. For 
example, Treisman found that in countries with low incomes, appointment decentralization, that 
is, where officials are not appointed by higher levels of authority, appears to increase corruption, 
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while decreasing it at higher income levels. Similar finding applies to the relationships between 
personnel share and perceived corruption (Treisman 2002).  
 
Both the studies that find a positive link between corruption and decentralization, and those that 
see the reverse effect are often vulnerable to endogeneity and omitted variable bias problems 
(Dreher 2006). Does decentralization lead to greater levels of corruption, or is it that corrupt 
central officials are likely to create new tiers of government to proliferate patronage and 
sinecures for colleagues (Treisman 2002)? Another methodological issue is a bias towards more 
developed industrialized countries in the data (de Mello 2000), which is presumably due to the 
fact of better data availability for that set of countries. Finally, as with scholarship on other 
aspects of decentralization, data on links between decentralization and corruption are often taken 
at a high level of aggregation. Units of analysis often include both state (in federal systems) and 
local government levels, although some studies also include controls for federal states (Fisman 
and Gatti 2002; Dreher 2006).  
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND FRAGMENTATION 
 
Ethnic diversity or fragmentation along communal, caste, clan, or linguistic lines might likewise 
impact on local performance. Cross-national studies of the drivers of local performance tend to 
include measures of ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization. When used as controls, they 
have not been shown to substantially affect the findings (Dreher 2006). As discussed earlier, 
many studies use data at very high levels of aggregation, which does not allow to perceive the 
local specificities. A more nuanced exploration of local dynamics would suggest that diversity 
and fragmentation do make a difference for the quality of local governance.  
 
Studies have shown how even where local governments are elected democratically, citizens may 
vote based on particular identities, and not actual performance record (Ahmad et al. 2005). In 
fact, race, religion, caste or other identities dominate the whole process—from candidate 
nomination, to election, to subsequent reward distribution. This undermines the whole premise 
upon which accountability is based.  
 
The setting up of local governments at small levels, which appear to be more homogenous, in 
fact may exacerbate extant deep-rooted structures of social exclusion, based on caste or other 
ethno-social criteria. This is because of selective provision of public goods to more privileged 
social groups (Ahmad et al. 2005). As a result, even after decentralization, there may be 
continued within-village inequalities in such key policy areas as access to education, as the 
example of India shows (Ahmad et al. 2005). Micro-level studies provide more nuanced 
assessments of what makes for good local performance than those where cross-national studies 
of local government use data at very high levels of aggregation. 
 
Mechanisms targeting specific under-privileged groups have been shown to address the above 
problem. In India’s localities, the post of the head of the popularly elected village council, the 
Gram Panchayat may be reserved in favour of representatives of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled 
Tribes. This has arguably led to greater targeting of public goods towards members of these 
groups; household public goods in particular are targeted at individuals of that group if they 
reside in the same village (Besley et al.).  
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ROLE OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL PARTY SYSTEMS AND POLITICS 
 
Political parties have received scant attention in most studies of decentralization. For instance, 
the widely cited Litvack et al. review article does not contain a discussion of parties or party 
systems (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Even where party political factors are recognised in 
the empirical literature on local governance, often parties are not explicitly incorporated into the 
explanatory frameworks for local performance.6  
 
And yet, political parties have been considered important to the healthy functioning of a 
democracy. They articulate and aggregate interests, help recruit leadership, adjudicate disputes 
between conflicting interests, and engage in government decision making. Their key normatively 
desirable role is the “linkage” function that they perform, connecting the ruler and the ruled, the 
policy maker and the citizen (Lawson 1980).  
 
At a local level too party development is seen as important for democracy. Parties may not play a 
key role in small communities where citizens have recourse to direct forms of democracy, such 
as township meetings and local plebiscites. However, they may have an important democratic 
role in areas with sizable populations, considering the magnitude and diversity of the local 
constituencies and their preferences. 
 
Parties are commonly distinguished from party systems. Party systems usually refer to 
politically-significant parties, which have a strong impact on national politics irrespective of 
their size. Party systems are distinguished based on the number of main parties, strength of their 
links to various social constituencies, ideological positioning on issue areas, and where the 
strongest parties lie on the left-right continuum (Parrott 1997). 
 
Parties may also affect performance in key local policy and service provision areas. Empirical 
studies have shown that parties often fail to fulfil the expectations of the “ideal world” linkage 
paradigm. The first key link between party systems and local performance is that various parties 
may advocate distinct policies, thus having variable implications for the local communities.7 The 
second link is possible conflict that party systems may bring into local decision making 
irrespective of their ideological orientation. While healthy from the point of view of democratic 
theory, conflict may have negative implications for local policy making. Parties may check 
power abuse however party polarization may hamper agreement on key policy issues thereby 
creating gridlock (Tarrow 1977: 228). Third, frequent party turnover may result in a high level of 
local administrative personnel turnover, which may negatively impact upon long-term policy 
consistency (Tarrow 1977: 230).  
 
The fourth link with performance stems from the fact that politicization of local decision making 
might encourage policy making that is based on clientelism, or on the “reciprocation of benefits,” 
(Stone 1980: 989), rather than on long-term policy considerations. In such settings, the supposed 
opposition may be reduced to circulation of posts whereby each party has a chance to “dig in for 
a short period of time” (Altman and Lalander 2003: 83). Local councillors belonging to a given 
                                                 
6 The discussion in this section is largely based on Lankina, Hudalla, and Wollmann, 2008. 
7 Party turnover may put at stake not just the sustainability of particular policies, but of the decentralization agenda 
as a whole, as was arguably the case in India’s state of Kerala (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). 
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party may be also interested more in advancing along the party career ladder, rather than 
satisfying the preferences of the local electorate (Ahmad et al. 2005).  
 
The fifth link with performance relates to dynamics involving local party systems and the central 
state. If national fiscal flows to the localities are affected by the correspondence of the governing 
party or coalition with party electoral outcomes in the localities, then these national factors may 
affect local wellbeing. Such practices have been observed in the Philippines, with the “centrally-
administered spoils system” that undercuts local planning, complicating efforts at 
decentralization (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001). The link with national politics may be 
very important considering that the localities often maintain a strong fiscal dependence on the 
central state or regional bodies. It strongly affects local accountability mechanisms in other ways 
as well. If the national party of power has become unpopular, a local mayor who belongs to that 
party may be ousted irrespective of how faithfully he or she fulfils his or her electoral mandate 
(Prud'homme 1995). In countries like Bolivia, national parties manipulate the whole process of 
election of mayors. In this country a provision existed whereby if a candidate for mayor did not 
receive over 50 percent of the vote, he or she could be elected by a municipal council. This and 
the no-confidence vote procedure against mayors have been overused in Bolivia as national 
political party leaders encouraged councillors to censure opposition parties. In 1999, 248 such 
censures were reported. This practice is hardly conducive to the stability and administrative 
continuity of local decision making (Altman and Lalander 2003). 
 
Although political institutions are important determinants of party systems and the stability of 
party constellations, they are sometimes inadequate for explaining political outcomes when 
considered in isolation from other factors. Cultural, historical, or social variables may also affect 
other institutions and actors. Scholars point to the importance of the existence of civic 
associations and crosscutting cleavages in affecting the likelihood of cooperativeness of political 
actors or parties (Putnam 1993; Lankina, Hudalla, and Wollmann 2008). The origins and 
duration of parties are likewise important factors. In Western democracies, parties, which have 
roots in the development of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, have a long history. In such settings 
with established party systems, voters have a strong and stable affiliation with particular parties. 
Party networks are also cohesive and well established, and political leadership tends to be stable 
(Sisk 2001).  
 
In some developing or newly democratizing countries, by contrast, parties do not command 
stable loyalties, with elections focusing on elites or personalities (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and 
Meagher 2001). New parties come and go, often serving the interests of particular individuals 
(Sisk 2001). Because economic ideology, which had been traditionally dominant in party 
identifications in Western democracies, is often not the main cleavage dividing parties in 
developing or newly-democratising settings, other issues may become salient, such as ethnicity 
(Evans and Whitefield 1995). This is why when identifications are structured around such 
cleavages they may be particularly prone to manipulation by populist or charismatic individuals. 
 
How historical and cultural contexts might influence the volatility of parties and voting 
preferences is illustrated by party development in post-communist contexts.  
Hungary provides an example of this tendency observed during the early stages of transition to 
democracy. Despite the relatively high degree of party institutionalization in Hungary compared 
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to other post-communist countries, the Hungarians’ voting preferences in the first post-
communist decade have shown high volatility in national elections. One possible way of 
measuring volatility is by examining the rate of parties that enter subsequent elections and the 
likelihood that the same parties would obtain similar results in successive elections. Using this 
method, scholars have estimated that for regional party list votes in the 1990 and 1994 
parliamentary elections, volatility was more than three times higher than the average in Western 
Europe recorded between 1885 and 1985. The high volatility rates in Hungary were observed 
throughout the 1990s. At the same time, voter party loyalties were low: surveys showed a 
preference for a swing from government to opposition among a substantial proportion of the 
electorate (Toka 1999). Hungary’s case is illustrative of the issues of party institutionalization in 
post-communist contexts, with other countries like Poland demonstrating even higher levels of 
volatility.   
 
Hungary also illustrates how local contexts might affect party volatility. This is because different 
localities had been subject to variable patterns of imperial incorporation, political, economic, and 
cultural development. Lankina et al. found greater party volatility and resort to more 
personalistic politics in Eastern Hungarian localities. In these areas, new elections resulted in 
politically-motivated turnovers in local administrations, disrupting policy continuity. 
Cooperativeness between parties was also very low. This record contrasted with Western 
Hungary, which had been subject to influences from Austria even under communism and had 
traditionally boasted a strong civil society. In this area, the study found more stable party 
loyalties and voting preferences. Even when a new party was voted into office, there was a 
relative stability of administrative personnel in the local administration (Lankina, Hudalla, and 
Wollmann 2008). Similar east-west patterns related to historical developments have been 
observed by scholars in Poland (Swianiewicz 2001).  
 
In contexts where party systems remain weakly institutionalised, the personal leadership skills of 
key political actors may be crucial in affecting local outcomes (Lankina, Hudalla, and Wollmann 
2007; Stone 1995). As Putnam’s study reminds us, the variable leadership qualities, value 
systems, and behavioral styles of individuals might result in quite different outcomes even if 
electoral arrangements and party systems are identical in two different settings (Putnam, 
Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Strong and effective leaders could help depoliticize the community 
even where party systems may not be conducive to consensual forms of decision making and 
policy continuity.   
 
APPROPRIATE POLICY SPHERE TO DECENTRALISE 
 
Any investigation of local performance in delivery of basic or essential services should begin by 
identifying what these services are and deciding on whether elected local government is the best 
level of authority to deliver the particular service. There is a general consensus that basic 
services are those that are consumed locally. Usually they relate to health, education, water, and 
sanitation (Ahmad et al. 2005).  
 
Local government performance will vary depending on the appropriateness of assigning 
particular service-providing or -delivery functions to lower, as opposed to higher, levels of 
authority (Shah). Several factors affect which level of authority is best suited to perform a given 
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service. One factor is the need to maintain economies of scale. Some services require high levels 
of coordination of units that transcend the narrow locality. Certain services might be also 
particularly skills-intensive. Local governments might not have the technical expertise to provide 
and deliver the relevant services because they seldom attract the nation’s top and most qualified 
personnel. Salaries tend to be lower than in national level bureaucracies or other agencies, and 
career prospects less exciting. These points are particularly salient in developing settings, where 
national governments invest little into training, research, and development, and sub-national—
almost none of their resources (Prud'homme 1995). 
 
Empirical findings in various countries support these arguments. States that have decentralised 
power and set up elected local governments also have a better record of providing access to 
essential drugs, building paved roads, or inoculating babies. At the same time, they perform less 
better in other policy areas, such as reducing youth illiteracy and providing sanitation facilities 
(Treisman 2002). A study of Tunisia found that local governments performed abysmally in water 
management. This record was substantially improved when a parastatal agency was put in charge 
of this policy area (Prud'homme 1995). In several Latin American countries, water and sanitation 
services decentralization resulted in a loss of economies of scale and poor service delivery. And 
in India, in what dovetails with Treisman’s findings, decentralization was not found to improve 
education for the rural poor (Ahmad et al. 2005). Another study focusing on one Indian state, 
Kerala, found that decentralization helped improve road construction, housing, and child 
services, while the findings on progress in employment, agricultural support, and irrigation, were 
more ambivalent (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). One literature survey of the drivers of 
primary healthcare performance found that in developing settings citizens often bypass the 
closest public healthcare facility in favour of either more costly private ones, or higher level 
public facilities. The reason for such choices is poor service quality of local public healthcare 
facilities (Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000).  
 
In Uganda and Tanzania lack of local government basic public finance management and 
accounting skills hampered capacity to provide public services. This led to reduced spending 
levels in such essential areas as primary healthcare. Another example is Ethiopia, where 
decentralization occurred even at the low, third, woreda level, but where some woredas 
reportedly lacked individuals who could even read or write (Ahmad et al. 2005). This finding 
links in with our discussion (below) of the appropriate size of local government units. However 
normatively desirable local governments may be as agencies close to the people, they may not 
have the appropriate capacity.  
 
Low citizen literacy and education are further reasons for low public sector accountability in 
specific policy fields. Local citizens often lack the knowledge to adequately assess the quality of 
complex services. The result is market imperfections in the sense that they cannot properly hold 
local policy makers accountable. What voters can assess are often wasteful, but highly visible 
projects, whose implementation also rewards narrow clients, but ultimately not the broader 
citizenry (Ahmad et al.). Lankina et al. found this to be the case in the Czech Republic, where 
one particularly badly performing municipality splashed out on a costly, but highly visible bridge 
across the river that flows through the city (Lankina, Hudalla, and Wollmann 2008). 
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Finally, local governments themselves could sabotage innovative policy efforts of state 
authorities. Central or regional government involvement may provide a critical push for services 
innovation. The state in fact, more so than elected local authorities, may play a critical role in 
enabling civil society in key policy areas. In Brazil, some popularly elected mayors obstructed 
state-led efforts at health reform because the Department of Health’s power of appointment of 
health officials challenged their structures of patronage (Tendler 1997). By contrast, the state 
was effective in pushing through and publicizing innovation, thereby also creating a wider public 
debate and scrutiny. Such a perspective challenges the romantic notion that local governments 
are the best institutions for ensuring policy and services effectiveness.  
 
Cross-country longitudinal studies focusing on specific policy areas, such as sanitation, 
healthcare, education, and infrastructure maintenance are needed in order to adequately assess 
under what conditions elected local authorities would perform these services better than other 
institutions. Unfortunately, few such studies are available. Many studies suffer from a 
methodological flaw of advocating “closely matching services with citizen preferences” without 
specifying the respective services (Huther and Shah 1998). They also create aggregate indicators 
of performance without distinguishing between various policy areas. Those that do focus on 
narrower policy areas or are case-study based also acknowledge the limitations of their method: 
simply too little time has elapsed since decentralization occurred. This makes it difficult to 
generalize about institutionalization or sustainability of given policies or performance record 
(Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
Local government performance is linked to the scope and nature of fiscal decentralization. Fiscal 
decentralization relates to taxation; central grants; borrowing/ access to capital markets; and 
allocation of local expenditure assignments. If local governments are denied the fiscal 
instruments and funding necessary to make real use of their political autonomy, decentralization 
is doomed to failure. Alternatively, excessive fiscal autonomy may undermine national 
government efforts at macro-economic stabilization. The ratio of “own” resources, such as taxes, 
to subsidies or grants, in local budgets, how access to capital markets is structured, and the share 
of local government expenditures in national expenditures are commonly used to ascertain the 
nature and degree of fiscal decentralization. Although many scholars call for far-reaching fiscal 
decentralization, such arrangements do not unambiguously lead to political autonomy or 
improved performance. 
 
On the taxation side, an important question is how to endow local governments with incentives 
for economic promotion while ensuring that they provide services adequately and guaranteeing 
economic equality through financial compensation to disadvantaged municipalities. In a tradition 
that goes back to Tiebout (Tiebout 1956), scholars argue that fiscal decentralization provides 
incentives for municipalities to compete for business revenues through appropriate taxation 
mechanisms. This arguably increases their efficiency, and ultimately affects performance. This 
premise dovetails with theories of bureaucratic and institutional competition. (Dreher 2006). 
Public choice theorists have likened cities to private firms, which compete against one another in 
the efficient use of local resources and in attracting capital and quality workforce (Peterson 
1981). Municipalities are seen as producers of goods and services, while local residents, as 
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consumers. The urban setting is regarded as a “market analogue” in such approaches. The 
localities try to outbid other towns in offering tax incentives to individuals. Citizens respond by 
opting to move to a locality that offers the best tax package (Judge, Stoker, and Wolman 1995: 
7). Competition and democratic accountability are also enhanced. Citizens look at other 
municipalities or regions to judge the performance of their own unit in what has been described 
as “yardstick competition” (Besley and Case 1995; Dreher 2006).  
 
It is generally recognised, however, that the picture is more complex in the real world. Local 
economic promotion and development is concerned with both wealth creation and employment 
and redistribution (Bennett 1990). Like social services, it generates “indivisible” public goods, 
which may be enjoyed by the citizenry as a whole (Clark 1985; Bish and Ostrom 1973). At the 
same time, it may provide “separable” goods which benefit specific groups, such as business 
contractors or the local elites. Moreover, policies that may be considered economically efficient 
may conflict with redistributive needs and pressures of marginalized social groups (Peterson 
1981). 
 
Many public finance theorists suggest that Tiboutian competition could be destructive even if it 
increases efficiency in the short term, and could lead to municipal “segregation.” A “race to the 
bottom”-type (Ahmad et al. 2005) low business taxation in richer localities would attract 
businesses and wealthy individuals to this particular locality, driving businesses and wealth away 
from others. Alternatively, high taxes on the rich and redistribution to the poor will tend to drive 
the former away form the locality and attract the latter. Decentralised systems by such logic are 
likely to increase, rather than decrease inter-jurisdictional disparities. In addition, because local 
governments are “open” systems (Peterson 1981), subject to greater spillover effects and shocks 
from external environments than are national governments, it is more appropriate to maintain 
fiscal arrangements that allow for retention of macroeconomic stabilization reigns with the 
centre. It is argued that control of a large share of taxes, particularly mobile ones (de Mello 
2000), and public expenditures should therefore remain the prerogative of the national 
government (Prud'homme 1995). At the same time, local government accountability could be 
enhanced if municipalities possess an own tax base, with the power to set the tax rate, usually 
personal income tax (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). They should also have the power to 
adjust tax rates to raise local revenues at the margins, thereby having less incentive to free-ride 
on central bailouts (Ahmad et al. 2005). 
 
In the developing world moreover, some key assumptions of the Tiboutian model, such as the 
existence of effective mechanisms for the exercise of “voice” or “exit” may not hold. Electoral 
mechanisms may be dysfunctional or otherwise serve as poor sources of accountability because 
of elite capture or other reasons. Poor infrastructure, weak markets for land, labour and capital, 
and low incomes may preclude the facility of “exit” (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). For 
instance, a study of decentralization in Uganda and the Philippines found that inter-jurisdictional 
mobility is “rarely driven by public health or education delivery” and that “voting has no effect 
on public good delivery” (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001: 64). 
  
Aside from taxation, the nature of central grants could shape local performance in important 
ways. Dependence on national grants in some policy areas is unavoidable. This is because the 
national government retains the power to achieve nationally-set agenda in such key areas as 
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education or family planning (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Where the initiative in key 
policy areas is devolved to the localities, national health initiatives may be undermined. This was 
arguably the case with immunization in Uganda (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001). At the 
same time, strong dependence on federal transfers has been shown to negatively affect local 
accountability. Such a dependence creates perverse incentives to divert or misallocate funds 
locally (Khemani 2004). One of the reasons for this outcome is that the money does not come 
from local taxpayers, who in turn do not have an incentive to monitor how it is spent. It is argued 
that decentralizing greater expenditure responsibilities than revenue sources results in a fall in 
the quality of services. A self-perpetuating dynamic ensues with ever greater demands for 
transfers from the national government (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998).  
 
Scholars of fiscal decentralization generally agree that local accountability is enhanced when at 
least a share of central grants are unconditional or with “no strings attached.” Under such fiscal 
arrangements, local governments have greater ability to tailor expenditures to local preferences. 
Such unconditional grants, particularly if they are unstable and subject to short-term annual 
adjustments or negotiation, could be subject to political manipulation however (Litvack, Ahmad, 
and Bird 1998). This has been arguably the case in Hungary and Russia (Lankina, Hudalla, and 
Wollmann 2008). India is another example of national grant making benefiting certain states at 
the expense of others. Scholars have suggested that setting up independent oversight 
commissions to monitor politically motivated or clientelistic grant making could serve as a 
corrective to such practices. The empirical record of the effectiveness of such commissions is 
mixed however (Ahmad et al. 2005).  
 
Generally, an established yardstick for measuring local autonomy is the share of local 
expenditures in proportion to total national expenditures. Some cross-national studies, using 
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) on sub-national revenues and expenditures found a 
link between sub-national expenditure share and good governance indicators (Dreher 2006). 
Other scholars have cautioned against facile conclusions based on aggregate data. They show 
how some countries could in fact have little revenue autonomy even though the aggregate level 
GFS data would suggest otherwise. The false estimation of fiscal decentralization variables in 
turn could substantially change research results, allowing researchers to draw “sweeping 
conclusions” (Yilmaz 2002). Expenditure decentralization could also lead to variable 
performance depending on the policy area. Treisman’s cross-national study found that larger 
subnational expenditure assignments were associated with better provision of paved roads. At the 
same time, they were associated with higher youth illiteracy rates and lower sanitation levels 
(Treisman 2002). 
 
Such cost-intensive expenditure assignments as healthcare or education might be formally a 
function of local government however de facto resources for these policy areas are allocated 
from regional or national governments. Scholars have found such arrangements to be detrimental 
to performance in essential policy areas. For instance, studies found low efficiency and high 
levels of corruption in healthcare provision in Nigeria, a country with some of the most far-
reaching decentralization arrangements in the developing world. This evidence suggests that 
over-dependence on grants from the centre may undermine popular accountability and result in 
low performance outcomes (Khemani 2004).  
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Furthermore, it is not uncommon for local governments with large expenditure assignments to 
suffer from the unfunded mandates problem. Resources are often lacking in local budgets and 
there are delays or failures in appropriations from higher levels of authority. Lack of funding in 
turn likewise impacts on performance. Many countries have “concurrent responsibilities” in 
expenditure and finance between national and local governments, while not defining precisely 
which level of authority is responsible for what. The result is “budget gaming” with the localities 
not having an incentive to close spending gaps and, having spent the national grants, demanding 
direct financing of these services by the national government (Ahmad et al. 2005). This too 
results in distorted structures of accountability: local government can always blame the national 
or regional authorities for delays in transfers. They thereby avoid responsibility and detract 
blame for their performance weaknesses. 
 
Finally, structures of access to capital markets are also important determinants of performance. 
Municipal borrowing could help fuel local economic development or plunge a municipality into 
debt or bankruptcy. The way municipalities access capital markets could encourage “soft budget 
constraint” scenarios (Ahmad et al. 2005; Dreher 2006). This happens when the national 
government steps in to bail a municipality out of debt. Alternatively, they may discourage it 
when rules of the game for borrowing or bankruptcy are transparent and clear. An example is 
Morocco, where transfers do not take account of borrowing (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). 
New Zealand or USA, where the courts intervene, and the national government is not looked 
upon as a “banker of last resort,” provide further examples (Ahmad et al. 2005: 9). This too has 
implications for local government accountability. Moreover, structures of access to capital 
markets should be designed with careful consideration of other fiscal aspects of decentralization. 
One study found that when sub-national authorities are free to borrow, while simultaneously 
being dependent on intergovernmental transfers, there is a high likelihood of large and persistent 
aggregate deficits. Argentina and Brazil are examples of how such a situation could lead to fiscal 
crises (Rodden 2002).  
 
THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LINES OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The structure of local government itself might substantially affect local performance and 
accountability. This premise is extensively theorised and documented in new institutionalism-
inspired studies of decentralization. There is now a large body of literature on how institutions 
account for cross-national variations in political outcomes (March and Olsen 1989; North 1990; 
Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Ostrom 1990). Institutions are understood both as 
formal structures and as “rules of the game” affecting the incentives and behavior of political 
actors (Przeworski 1991). Scholars have suggested various ways of manipulating local actor 
incentive structures through institutional design. One could impose more or less centralist 
arrangements, change the size of municipalities or local electoral rules, or the formal 
relationships between the representative and the executive bodies (Keating 1995). 
 
In designing local government institutions, five factors are of particular importance: the 
organization of the legislative bodies; the balance between elected local authorities and local 
executives and administrators; the manner in which executives are elected or appointed; 
councillor structures of accountability; and the manner in which the councils are elected. These 
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various arrangements have various impacts on local actor and voter incentives for particular 
types of preferences, decision making, and outcomes. 
 
The first factor, legislative organization, refers to the way decision making is structured within 
the representative bodies, the formation of committees, and presence of conflict resolution 
mechanisms. For instance, there might be two distinct sets of preferences among legislators, but 
no system for assigning responsibility for shaping agreement into specific proposals or budgets. 
Councillors may be reluctant to openly take one position or another, hence the likelihood of a 
stalemate. Logrolling may also be more or less likely depending on the policy issue and structure 
of decision making. Scholars have argued that council committees may have an impact on how 
such conflicts and pressures are resolved and channelled (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004).  
 
Even in western settings little empirical literature exists on the structure, functioning and impacts 
of local council committees. Most studies focus on environmental influences on local 
governments, but not on the black box of policy making in committees. Committees are usually 
in place for facilitating councillors’ effective and efficient policymaking. The limited empirical 
evidence that exists on American local government committees suggests that in practice their 
policy and legislative functions are quite limited. Size also affects the relative role of 
committees. Larger cities have diverse policy goals and citizen demands and have a greater need 
for such policy-facilitating structures. Reformed cities with city managers, at large elections, and 
non-partisan councils are less likely to rely on or have committees as decision making is centred 
on the administrative apparatus of the manager. By contrast, mayor-council local governments in 
larger jurisdictions and with large numbers of councillors were found to have committees with 
broader policy and oversight functions. Spending in such cities was also found to be higher than 
in cities without committees, but only in some policy areas, such as housing, community 
development, and fire protection. This led scholars to conclude that in areas with redistributive 
politics, committees are likely to increase spending that benefits their constituencies (Pelissero 
and Krebs 1997). 
 
This first factor of legislative organization links with the second one related to executive weight. 
Strong leadership is important for shaping council outcomes in the absence of policy consensus. 
Institutional arrangements that assign strong weight to the local executive might be seen as 
detrimental to local accountability. Under such arrangements, local councils risk being 
marginalised and reduced to rubber-stamping the preferences of the local executive. At the same 
time, local governments with strong councils and weak executives risk being reduced to 
“debating chambers,” unable to reach sound policy decisions or push through a developmental 
objective.  
 
Much of the debate as to the weight of representative versus executive bodies in local 
government and their precise structuring centres on questions of politics versus administration. 
Democratic accountability is linked to these questions and is among the key factors in deciding 
on the merits of the respective arrangements. A simple summary of the politics versus 
administration dichotomy is the institutional separation of administration from politics (Montjoy 
and Watson 1995). Both the managerial administrative arrangements and those that privilege the 
political side of local government may create distorted structures of accountability.  
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The local government politics versus administration dichotomy is rooted in the turn of the 19th-
early 20th century Progressive Era in America. Urban governance in America at the time was 
notoriously plagued by political machines, patronage, and corruption. Rather than being an 
instrument of democratic accountability, elections were a form of trading votes for favours to 
narrow, ward-based constituencies. In  their classic study of United States’ urban governance, 
Banfield and Wilson distinguish between public and private regarding forms of accountability. 
The former refers to broad-based service for the public good, and the latter—to patron rewards to 
clients in the form of jobs or other favours (Banfield and Wilson 1963).  
 
The party machines that ran American cities had a strong presence in the local councils. 
Candidates for council positions ran on party ticket, and electoral districts were based on wards, 
which arguably encouraged narrow-based voting. In the context of the industrialization-fuelled 
influx of immigrant populations, elections and spoils division also acquired a pronounced ethnic 
and particularistic dimension (Ruhil 2003). Such politicised and patronage-based local 
governance arguably resulted in mismanagement, inefficiencies, and public waste. 
 
The reaction of the Progressive Movement was to seek institutional engineering solutions that 
would depoliticise local decision making and free it from the power of urban political machines 
(Montjoy and Watson 1995). Reformed cities were to elect local councils based on city-wide at-
large districts. This was to undermine partisanship in local decision making. Councillors had to 
garner the support of the city-based electorate, and not that of a small, ethnically-homogenous 
ward which they could control and manipulate through their patronage (Ruhil 2003). They would 
appoint a city manager, who would be above politics, and whose contract could be revoked 
should his efficient management of the city falter. Appointment and personnel decisions were 
also removed from politics, with hiring and firing decisions becoming the province of civil 
service commissions, and not politicians (Ruhil 2003). Some scholars found that city manager 
cities did perform better in terms of efficiency and local economic development (Lineberry and 
Fowler 1967; Ruhil et al. 1999; Hayes and Chang 1990; but see Morgan and Pelissero 1980). 
Democratic accountability of such cities has been questioned however. Under the guise of broad-
based public service to the community, it has been argued, such cities best served the interests of 
the urban middle- and upper- classes and business interests which were behind the Progressive 
Movement in the first place (Ruhil 2003).   
 
Others, however, suggest that a shift to “progressive” forms of city administration reflected the 
changing ethnic and social mix of America and did in fact mirror the preferences of the wider 
electorate. The melting pot phenomenon gradually eroded the narrow ethnicity- or religion-based 
constituencies that sustained the political machines in the first place, with formerly homogenous 
wards becoming ethnically mixed (Ruhil 2003). Urbanization and increase in population size 
likewise made clientelistic politics less likely. It thereby also increased the need for more 
impartial, broad-based forms of local politics and decision making. Rather than being an 
expression of middle- or upper-class preferences, less politicised and more impartial forms of 
local government have been ostensibly an expression of the broader will of the changing 
American urban electorate. 
 
Although rooted in the American context, these debates and empirical practice continue to be 
salient in other contexts. The era before the Progressive Movement shows how electoral 
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democracy at a local level may not result in outcomes that are conducive to broad-based 
democratic accountability. If fact, it shows how institutional arrangements that privilege ward-
based party voting could perpetuate and institutionalise narrow ethnicity-, faith-based, or other 
such cleavages. This historical record resonates with contemporary efforts to develop local 
government in newly democratizing and developing settings. In ethnically-stratified or otherwise 
fragmented societies, absent a check on excessive politicisation of local government, there may 
be a risk of local councils turning into support infrastructures favouring the interests of particular 
groups. In such fragmented societies, where parties are often structured along ethnic lines, 
politicisation of local decision making may also imply politicisation of ethnicity. The rural and 
small size of the local government units or electoral jurisdictions is likely to perpetuate this 
trend. Both the American historical record and contemporary evidence from developing 
countries suggests that as urbanization and the size of constituencies increases, the potential for 
such particularistic voting even in politicised local governments decreases.  
 
In American cities, and in other contexts, vesting power with a strong executive has been 
therefore regarded as a means for effectively managing a locality without interference from 
narrow political interests. Not just efficiency, but also accountability would also be strengthened 
in the process. A bureaucracy could be buffered from particularistic politics if policy making 
were subject to more hierarchical lines of accountability (Montjoy and Watson 1995).  
 
Although precise institutional mechanisms for assigning the weight to the respective 
representative and executive bodies may vary from country to country, three types of 
institutional arrangements are most widespread and have received the most attention in the 
literature on local government. The first is the mayor-council institutional set-up, also called 
strong mayor system. Under this arrangement, there is an at-large or district-based elected 
council, and a popularly elected mayor, who wields strong executive, often charismatic, 
authority. The mayor both decides on public policy issues, and also has a strong symbolic role in 
representing the city (Sisk 2001). Various arrangements govern relationships between the mayor 
and council under this institutional set-up. The mayor may have charter-based veto authority 
over council decisions, and procedures may exist for council over-riding of this veto, or the 
mayor may entirely lack veto power. Because the political and administrative roles are not as 
sharply distinguished under such an arrangement, it has arguably had an effect on policy 
continuity. For example, empirical studies have shown how electoral turnover, particularly when 
a new mayor defeats an incumbent, result in proclivities for greater public expenditures and 
policy changes (Wolman, Strate, and Melchior 1996). 
 
The second type of institutional arrangement is election of the mayor by the council, usually 
from amongst council members, with the council therefore possessing stronger weight vis-à-vis 
the executive. This system is also referred to as strong council or parliamentary system. The 
council has considerable legislative authority, with councillors also often collectively 
administering the bureaucracy (Sisk 2001). The mayor under such an arrangement is often 
reduced to chairing council meetings, has a largely ceremonial role, and usually limited 
administrative functions (Wollmann 2005).  
 
The third type of arrangement, which is frequent under many strong council systems, and is an 
outgrowth of the Progressive Movement, is the council-manager institutional set-up. Under this 
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arrangement the council appoints on a contract basis a politically neutral administrator to run and 
manage the city. Although the manager is accountable to the council, he or she is expected to be 
free to administer local affairs without interference, while also having freedom in recruitment to 
the local bureaucratic apparatus (Booth 1968). Such an arrangement arguably precludes 
politically-motivated patronage (Montjoy and Watson 1995). It has been suggested that because 
of independence from political influences, city managers may be more likely to pursue policy 
innovation compared to elected mayors. Because their careers are at stake, they are ostensibly 
more guided by actual effectiveness and efficiency, rather than short-term electoral 
considerations and pressure-group demands, which would have been the case with elected 
political executives (Montjoy and Watson 1995). Not being subject to frequent politicised 
turnovers, such executives are also more likely to ensure policy continuity and to have credible 
commitments to other actors involved in local development, such as contractors (Clingermayer 
and Feiock 1997).  
 
While many studies support this expectation of the manager role, others have suggested that the 
politics versus administration dichotomy is exaggerated. Managers in fact have come to play an 
important policy role, feeding information and advice to elected officials and otherwise shaping 
policy (Morgan and Watson 1992; Svara 1998). At the same time, councils may be in practice 
quite active in administrative matters, such as hiring decisions even when there is a manager. 
Rather than being a dichotomy, such a system is “based on combining representative democracy 
and professionalism in a unique approach to governance” (Svara 1998: 57). Empirical studies of 
other settings, such as Western Europe, support these premises. Even if a chief executive officer 
is a civil servant with administrative duties (Finland), in what is a “hybrid” role constellation, his 
or her role may be highly political. This is because of party political links, visibility, and national 
and even international roles of this position (Sandberg). At the same time, the ostensibly 
political, popularly elected mayors in West European democracies, such as Germany, often 
choose to maintain a non-political profile. They prioritise professionalism and their functions as 
administrators (Wollmann 2005). 
 
Under a council-manager system, a popularly elected mayor may be a second executive elected 
by the council from amongst its members. Under such an arrangement, the mayor presides over 
the council, and his or her role is largely ceremonial (Svara 1987). As such, the mayor has been 
likened to a chairman of the board, “important but not crucial to the operation of the 
organization” (Svara 1987: 213). There is disagreement on the merits of this latter type of 
arrangement. Some scholars argue that because leadership cannot be collective, either the 
manager or the mayor end up being marginalized and are likely to engage in conflicts. In cities of 
larger size, it has been suggested mayors even end up securing a dominant role in local decision 
making thereby sidelining the manager (Morgan and Watson 1992).  
 
Other scholars however have suggested that formal arrangements do not preclude effective 
leadership even by a largely ceremonial mayor and that destabilizing conflict between mayors 
and managers is in fact rare under such arrangements (Booth 1968). In such circumstances, 
leadership skills or “rare personal characteristics” (Svara 1987: 212) of the individual who fills 
this position become essential (Morgan and Watson 1992). Depending on which role such a 
mayor chooses for him- or herself, he or she could be a coordinator, stabilizer, goal setter, 
organizer, policy advocate, or even activist and reformer. These roles may have a positive impact 
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on local governance as long as these individuals see their role as “strengthening the other 
participants in the governing process rather than controlling or supplanting them” (Svara 1987: 
225). Such an arrangement therefore has been advocated as one providing leadership, brokering 
between political and bureaucratic interests (Morgan and Watson 1992), and blending the merits 
and talents of the political arm of local government (elected officials) and professional 
administrators (Svara 1987).  
 
The fourth type of arrangement is a commission form of municipal government, whereby elected 
commissioners also manage separate departments. The commissioners are both legislators and 
department chairs. All have equal powers even though one of the commissioners may have the 
title of mayor. Hiring decisions to appoint administrators are taken by majority vote under this 
system. The system has been criticised for violating the principle of the division of powers 
(Montjoy and Watson 1995).  
  
As in Western settings, local government institutional engineering efforts in newly 
democratizing and developing countries face the challenge of finding appropriate balance 
between efficiency and democracy, politics and administration, council weight versus executive 
management and leadership. In practice, in many such countries executives end up wielding 
greater power than the legislative bodies (Olowu 2003; Lankina, Hudalla, and Wollmann 2008). 
Partisanship is also an issue in local councils, and institutional modifications have been 
introduced accordingly to reduce it in some countries. For example, in Ghana, multi-party 
elections are prohibited at a local level to avoid division of councils along party lines and enable 
them to focus on “bread and butter issues” (Olowu 2003: 47).  
 
Not only do policy makers in these contexts encounter issues similar to those that reformers in 
early 20th century America faced, but they also confront additional challenges. For example, the 
structure of accountability of the local executive may not be only reduced to relations with the 
council and the electorate. Other accountability mechanisms may be in place reflecting partial 
and haphazard decentralization efforts. In some settings, mayors may be popularly elected and 
therefore presumably downwardly accountable. At the same time, they may combine their mayor 
functions with executive positions in other levels of authority, and be also subject to appointment 
and dismissal by them. This practice has existed in Russia where a popularly elected city mayor 
could be simultaneously an appointed minister in the cabinet of the regional governor (Lankina 
2004). 
 
The structure of bureaucratic accountability of local administrations, and not just the key 
executive, could likewise have a substantial bearing on local performance. The preceding 
sections have alluded to the complexity of policy areas, legal, and fiscal institutional 
environments in which local governments operate. Because local governments often perform 
state-delegated functions, or receive funding for them from regional or national bodies, authority 
and jurisdiction over certain policy areas or functions is bound to be overlapping. Rubin’s 
critique of the fad-inspired usage of accountability in the recent literature on decentralization 
warrants caution in making simplistic juxtapositions of “downward accountability” as inherently 
more conducive to better performance, and the stigmatised “upward accountability” to higher 
bureaucracies (Rubin 2005). 
 
 28 
Some form of accountability to higher levels of authority may be unavoidable for local 
authorities performing state-delegated or state-funded tasks in addition to those that are within 
their exclusive sphere. What often hampers performance are not such structures of “upward 
accountability” per se, but confusion as to which agency is responsible for what, and distorted 
incentive structures. Local authorities are frequently deprived of even limited leverage over 
service-providing employees operating within their jurisdictions. The following discussion of 
empirical practice also makes clear that in many settings both the representative and executive 
arms of local government are accountable to, and are often subject to appointment-dismissal by, 
higher executive authorities. Such a constellation is particularly damaging for local performance 
and democratic accountability because effective checks and balances are absent. 
 
With respect to local government executive bodies, scholars point to the problem of “misaligned 
responsibilities” in many decentralizing settings (Khemani 2004). The studies cited here are 
illustrative of the general trend of a juxtaposition of the idealised “downward” versus negativized 
“upward” structures of accountability, and of the underestimation of the degree of local 
government accountability to the central bureaucracies even in industrialised Western 
democracies. Nevertheless, these studies also provide valuable insights into the confusing and 
poorly designed legal and institutional frameworks for local government services provision and 
delivery.  
 
Pakistan has been cited as an example of “misaligned” structures of accountability 
accompanying decentralization. Here devolution of responsibility for education to the school 
districts occurred but school teachers remained provincial government employees. The district 
elected executive, the nazim has little authority over them (Ahmad et al. 2005). Uganda is 
another such example. Here despite devolution in healthcare, key decisions and drugs provision 
remain the prerogative of the centre, while salaries and staffing—of the district level. This 
undermines local incentives for efficiency and responsiveness (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 
2001). And in the Philippines, despite decentralization of aspects of education, the centre 
maintains full responsibility for policy, curriculum, personnel, and operations. This is often the 
case with decentralizations in general, and has been recorded in India, Bangladesh, Malawi, and 
Tanzania. As one study suggested, “political and fiscal devolution may have proceeded apace, 
but administrative changes may only approximate deconcentration.” Rather than creating 
democratic checks and balances, such systems “confuses[s] incentives, weaken[s] accountability 
for service delivery, and create[s] conflicts of interest.” (Ahmad et al. 2005: 10). 
 
At the same time, there is evidence that local councils could scrutinise and hold accountable even 
the state appointed bureaucrats at a local level. Crook and Manor demonstrate how in India’s 
state of Kerala power balance gradually shifted to the panchayat level despite the presence of 
state appointees at a local level. While the councillors did not have formal authority over these 
officials, they resorted to public shaming of ineffective bureaucrats, and to reporting on them to 
the line ministry bodies at the state level. The bureaucrats themselves perceived the merits of 
such control by elected bodies: should they be responsive to local needs, they could enlist the 
local councils’ support in lobbying for resources at the District Council level. Bureaucratic 
accountability to the elected local authorities was therefore strengthened even given the formal 
lines of upward accountability (Crook and Manor 1998).  
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Dual or overlapping formal structures of accountability could be also characteristic of 
councillors, and not just executives. As discussed above, this could be particularly damaging for 
the representative and checks-and-balances function of the local elected bodies. While executive 
positions are generally considered to be full-time occupations, in many settings, councillor 
positions are low paying, and are part time. In America, for example, most city councils, with the 
exception of some very large municipalities, have part-time local councils, and the frequency of 
their meetings varies. These individuals hold full-time jobs in other sectors and their council 
duties are motivated by civic spirit and volunteerism, and not necessarily career aspirations in 
politics (Pelissero and Krebs 1997).  
 
The situation is similar in Western Europe. A recent comprehensive Council of Europe (CoE) 
report on the status and working conditions of local deputies found this to be the case in most 
CoE countries. Few councillors receive salaries although some form of allowance to cover 
council-related expenses is common. Even so, the report found that very limited funds are 
available for performing basic constituency services related to travel, special assignments, and 
representation. In some countries the law allows councillors to take limited time off their normal 
employment to perform their tasks as councillors. In others, however, it is usually public 
employees who enjoy this right, or it is not stipulated in legislation and councillors have to make 
special arrangements with their employers. Often, some limited time band is specified which 
includes formal council meetings, but not other council-related engagements, such as the writing 
of reports. No country was found to have an agreement that employer- granted leave entails no 
loss of pay, although in practice the record varies and some type of informal arrangements may 
be in place (Council of Europe).  
 
Job security is also an issue according to the CoE report. Unlike local executives with the status 
of civil servants, who enjoy the right to keep their job and return to it once their term of office is 
over, this is uncommon for elected representatives working for firms or those who are self-
employed. The CoE conclusion was that lack of job security presents substantial obstacles to 
performance of councillor duties. The CoE stressed the need for effective legal mechanisms 
against penalizing employees (such as loss of job security or remuneration) while they perform 
their council duties (Council of Europe). Recently, some European states or sub-national regions 
have initiated reforms to raise or introduce councillor salaries. In Scotland, for example, a 
minimum salary linked to the salary structure of Scottish MPs was recently proposed to 
encourage more qualified candidates, and those representing wider sections of the community, to 
stand for election.8 A recent joint report of the rural communities of England, Wales, and Finland 
likewise urged a move away from “amateur” councillor to a more professional, “properly 
remunerated” one, so as to cope with the professional duties and diversify the representatives’ 
social profile (Communities 2007) . 
 
At the same time, formal arrangements or informal practice are often in place to ensure that 
executive-representative functions are not overlapping in CoE states’ councils. In the 
Netherlands, executives from the provincial level of authority other than the governor are 
allowed to be elected to local councils, but political parties prevent this from happening. In 
Spain, Finland, and Norway legal arrangements prevent senior administrative officials 
                                                 
8 Helene Mulholland, “Call for £20,000 Councillor Pay,” Guardian Unlimited, 25 February 2005 (accessed 28 
August 2007). 
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supervising the local authority from running for local council office, while in Italy and 
Luxembourg all such officials, and not just the most senior ones, face this legal ban. Some 
restrictions are in place in France as well, while in the UK higher-grade civil servants may not 
hold elected office in a local authority.  
 
Provisions against conflict of interest involving other figures are also in place. In Belgium, 
Spain, Italy, and Luxembourg public works and local services contractors working with a local 
authority may not stand for election in that local jurisdiction. In these and other European 
countries various restrictions are also in place banning university professors, lawyers, judges, 
members of armed forces, and even clergymen from running for local councillor positions 
(Council of Europe). 
 
In many newly democratising or developing settings by contrast, while councillors likewise tend 
to perform their duties on a part-time basis and are not remunerated, or only poorly remunerated, 
no safeguards against dual structures of accountability and conflict of interest are in place. In 
many such countries, particularly in smaller localities, councillors are also full-time executive 
functionaries dependent on, and accountable to, higher bureaucracies. Because their primary 
occupations and incomes are outside of their functions as local councillors, so is their 
accountability. In Russia, a comparative study of local councils found that in some areas the 
councils were packed with senior employees of medical and educational institutions, such as 
hospital directors and school principals (Lankina 2004). Organized social and political interests 
were not represented or under-represented in the local bodies. Instead, there was evidence of 
“executivization” of local councils, as well as the predominance of the managerial elite. The 
study found that state and municipal employees formed large proportions of the local deputy 
corps in many regions in Russia. In the region of Altay, for example, they constituted over half 
of all councillors, and almost a third in Buryatiya. At least 50 percent of councillors in Altay, 
Buryatiya, Kalmykiya, Mariy El, and Chuvashiya were heads of enterprises. Public employees, 
such as school principals, are appointed by higher-level bureaucracies on a contract basis. They 
may lean towards satisfying the political preferences of regional authorities because their jobs 
depend on short-term contracts, which could be revoked. Private enterprise directors however are 
likewise subject to control and manipulation by higher authorities because their tax privileges 
and licenses could be withdrawn at random. Such councillors are less likely to be properly 
accountable to the citizens that elected them (Lankina 2004). Other countries provide similar 
examples of dual structures of councillor accountability. In Ghana, a large share (one third) of 
the local councillors are formally appointed by state bodies, while in both Kenya and Ghana 
members of parliament could be ex officio members on local councils (Olowu, Wunsch, and 
Ayee 2004). In India, some states have power to remove elected representatives or dissolve 
panchayats (Mathew and Mathew 2003). Another example of distorted structures of councillor 
accountability is Indonesia. Here the practice in many villages of having councillors chosen by 
the village head reduced their accountability to the villagers. By contrast, villagers who 
participated in government organizations were more vocal and influential during village council 
meetings, marginalizing the councillors even further (Ahmad et al. 2005).  
 
In many countries, councillor positions also overlap with leadership of key patrimonial or other 
traditional structures. This likewise generates pressures for particularistic and not broad-based 
sources of accountability. In Indonesia, even the popularly elected councillors derive authority 
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from patrimonial ties to the state, and not the local citizenry that elected them. This situation 
even under democratic decentralization is a product of colonialism and Suharto-era politics. 
Under Suharto, local traditional authorities and village heads were relied upon to construct and 
perpetuate traditional, customary, and hereditary power. These traditional authorities served as 
social mobilization structures garnering support for the central state in exchange for recognition 
and reinforcement of their authority and disbursement of resources (Ito 2008). These actors use 
their patrimonial positions in society to get elected to the local councils in the first place. Unless 
we are dealing with settings where traditional authorities enjoy genuine popular support and are 
perceived to be legitimate actors, local councils could thus serve to perpetuate, rather than 
remedy, extant structures of social oppression or inequities, doing little to improve local 
performance. 
 
South Africa provides an illustration of how traditional authorities could shape the design of 
local government institutions under democratic decentralization, which they then proceed to 
infiltrate and use to perpetuate patrimonial social practices. Munro writes how in the course of 
the negotiation of the 1993 Local Government Transition act, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in 
KwaZulu-Natal ensured that traditional authorities would be at the centre of local government. It 
pushed for the institutionalization of ethnicity, culture, and tradition-based group rights in the 
federal constitution and presented the rural chiefs as the “core of the Zulu nation” (Munro 2001: 
301). It also allied itself with rural chiefs and urban machine bosses in control of important 
resources that were used to maintain citizen allegiance. In 1994, a key resource, tribal land, was 
vested with the Zulu king as trustee, while chiefs secured power of control over territories. The 
victory of IFP in the 1994 provincial elections gave them the final upper hand in shaping local 
government institutions. These elections also demonstrated how democratic process could be 
subverted by a top-down strategy with chiefs “turn[ing] out their subject to vote” (Munro 2001: 
303). This strategy was successful not so much because people were “duped” into voting, but 
due to genuine allegiance to the party and the cultural traditions that it represented. Once local 
government institutions were designed and put into place, the overlap between party political and 
chiefs’ power was also transposed onto local electoral institutions (Munro 2001).  
 
Control over voters could be both informal and formal. A study of local governance in Russian 
regions draws on Banfield’s classic work on political influence in a local setting  to 
conceptualise these as “structures of control” (Banfield 1961). Traditional authorities at the helm 
of social networks, such as the chiefs in Africa, or heads of kinship clans, and elders, such as in 
Russia’s North Caucasus regions, often marshal genuine respect and allegiance by network 
members. There are elaborate structures of rewards for those who comply and sanctions against 
those who deviate from network norms (Munro 2001; Lankina 2004). Such traditional structures 
of control explain why in clan- and kinship-based societies in Russia’s ethnically-defined 
regions, the regional elite manage to deliver staggering 80 or even higher percent votes for 
regional or federal presidential incumbents or political parties that are in power. As in Indonesia, 
in Russia, the national or regional power elites encourage the perpetuation of such traditional 
structures of control because of the facility with which “the right” votes could be delivered 
(Lankina 2004; Ito 2008). 
 
Formal organizations may be also conceptualised as structures of control. This could be 
characteristic of any organizational settings, but particularly so in contexts with a historical 
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record of being “administered societies” (Kassof 1964). Countries with socialist legacies fit this 
description well. Even in post-communist contexts, the employment structure of many localities 
centres on the public sector or, in mono-industrial towns, on one or two enterprises. Not just 
employment, but also recreation revolves around these enterprises. Enterprise managers have 
powerful influence over employees because they control the flow of rewards and could exercise 
sanctions. They become important players during elections, either pressuring employees to vote 
for certain candidates, or enjoying strong support if they choose to run themselves (Lankina 
2004). Once elected, they proceed to use public office to ensure preferential treatment for their 
enterprises, favourable tax regimes, or circumvention of environmental standards. Although 
citizens may have voluntarily cast their votes for these individuals, this is a distortion of the 
whole concept of voice and accountability. Dependent on enterprise heads for their jobs, they 
will continue to vote them into office even as public roads, the environment, and social services 
deteriorate. 
         
Other studies have also shown how even decision making within the elected authorities could be 
shaped by patrimonial social structures. As one scholar of South Africa wrote, “patriarchy 
remains rife among many gender insensitive councillors.” “Once elected to local politics, the 
participation of women in male-dominated structures is often inhibited by patriarchical norms” 
(Ballington 2001: 193). This finding echoes that of Crook and Manor in India. These scholars 
show how the election of marginalized groups to Indian panchayats does not always ensure that 
they will exercise voice on behalf of their constituencies. In fact, within-council decision-making 
reproduces social structures of hierarchy and inequality (Crook and Manor 1998).  
 
SIZE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT 
 
The size of local government unit is usually discussed quite broadly as one of the main reasons 
for decentralization. It is suggested that local preference matching would be better at a local level 
given intimate familiarity with local dwellers and their preferences (Yilmaz 2002). What size is 
the best however, is not given extensive consideration in the literature. There is a tendency to 
expect local governments to perform equally well a variety of services irrespective of their size 
(Prud'homme 1995). Scholars also tend to use “local” in reference to states in federal systems, 
while drawing broader inferences about the impact of decentralization and local government on 
performance and accountability (Khemani 2001). The insights from the literature on federalism 
(Shah; Treisman 2002; Sharma 2005) as applied to local governments could be misleading. This 
is because the magnitude of states in a federation is very different from those of local 
governments.  
 
There are direct and indirect links between the size of the local government unit, that is, the 
territory and populations that it covers, and its performance.9 The population size of the 
municipality and the area that it covers is central to deciding on the nature and scope of policy 
which is most appropriate for it. Litvack et al. suggest that “decision-making should occur at the 
                                                 
9 Even where data are provided on the number of municipalities in a given country, as well as on how many 
settlements a municipality covers, sometimes even the most comprehensive assessments of the drivers of local 
performance neglect to provide the information on the population or geographic size of the settlements that are being 
studied (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001). 
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lowest level of government consistent with allocative efficiency,” with variable “optimal size” 
for each service area (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998: 10). Prud’homme provides another 
convenient distinction among three factors that one ought to consider in deciding on the most 
appropriate service-provision or -delivery area for local governments: its “externability,” 
“chargeability,” and “technicity” (Prud'homme 1995: 215).  
 
A village-level local government unit could not be expected to take full charge of highways, 
because their importance extends beyond the narrow administrative unit of a given locality 
(“externability”). Assigning this policy area to larger units, with jurisdiction encompassing 
several municipalities, would be more appropriate. Services for which local consumers could be 
easily charged, such as water or power are more appropriately assigned to the local level than 
those that are not, such as education (“chargeability”). And administrative capacity and skills, 
“technicity,” would be another factor when deciding on which local unit would be best for 
providing a particular service. Managing such policy areas as healthcare is highly skills 
intensive. Local governments in larger urban or county settings, or state authorities, are more 
likely to attract qualified staff than are those at lower, village levels of authority, where not just 
professional qualifications, but basic literacy is an issue. Moreover, local government reforms 
tend to stall precisely because political and fiscal decentralization is not accompanied by overall 
public administration reforms that would address issues of adequate staffing (Ahmad et al. 
2005).  
 
Some studies specifically addressed the impact of small-sized units on performance and found 
greater levels of accountability and improved service delivery. This was arguably the case in 
Uganda after decentralization (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004). Other studies however suffer 
from a contradiction of advocating or criticizing decentralization, while not identifying the size 
of the unit that is best conducive to good performance. One study of the effects of local 
government on social capital includes a discussion of the merits of the proximity of the local 
government to the local citizenry. At the same time it finds that “confidence in government is 
also boosted by large subnational governments” (de Mello 2000: 20). And yet, a large 
subnational government is also likely to have jurisdiction over a very large territory, and is quite 
distinct from the Tocquevillian ideal upon which the study’s arguments of the link of local 
government proximity and social engagement are based. So even if large subnational 
governments are positively associated with social capital, it may not be for reasons stated in the 
study.  
 
Likewise, one study sought to ascertain the greater or lesser likelihood of vigilant voting in local 
versus national elections. Vigilant voting is when citizens evaluate incumbents retrospectively on 
the basic of overall performance. The study contrasts this with myopic voting, whereby only 
performance in the year preceding the election is taken into account (Khemani 2001). In the 
study “local” refers to the state level of authority in India. While the findings point to greater 
likelihood of vigilant voting, and hence, levels of democratic accountability, at state levels, they 
may not be applicable to lower, local government levels of authority. The reasons are 
information asymmetries among the various social strata and generally lower levels of 
information on local, compared to state, politics. 
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In fact, comparative empirical work in developing settings revealed that in smaller localities, 
citizens tend to rely on traditional community leaders or friends and family, rather than the 
media, for information on local public affairs, while relying on the media for information on 
national politics. This practice facilitates elite capture and weakens accountability. Moreover, 
local officials themselves tend to serve as the main source of information on local government. 
At the same time, as a study of Uganda and the Philippines showed, local authorities do not 
always show evidence of having better information on local needs than higher levels of 
government. This likewise makes the whole concept of accountability problematic. Physical 
proximity does not guarantee that sub-national governments will possess the required 
information. And citizens will not always make the effort to inform the local authorities of their 
preferences (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001).  
 
Linked to this finding is evidence that creating units at very small rural levels of authority might 
do little to correct extant structures of social exclusion, marginalization, or oppression, and can 
even exacerbate them. Crook and Manor found that in Kerala, in areas with elected bodies at or 
just above the village level, “it is very difficult to break down the dominance (in both gender and 
caste terms) of conservative men from landowning castes. Women councillors who press their 
claims at that level risk embarrassment and intimidation, and the Scheduled Castes risk 
harassment and violence” (Crook and Manor 1998: 79).  
 
It has been also well documented that small, particularly rural, jurisdictions with traditional or 
patrimonial social structures in place become convenient material for top-down social 
organizational control or manipulation. This becomes evident during local or national elections 
(Ames 1994; Pugh and Cobble 2001; Munro 2001). In ethnically-fragmented or post-civil war 
communities, failure to comply might mean violence or even threat to one’s life (Pugh and 
Cobble 2001). This contrasts with larger, more fragmented, and competitive municipalities 
where top-down structures of influence over voters would be less dominant.     
 
Caution should be therefore exercised in generalizing the findings of decentralization in general 
to lower local government levels. The same applies to studies that use the number of sub-national 
tiers as a right-hand variable to assess the impact of decentralization on performance (Dreher 
2006). One study found that higher numbers of sub-national administrative tiers negatively affect 
performance. At the same time a higher share of sub-national unit employees is positively 
associated with good performance. This logically implies that polities with fewer tiers but 
covering larger jurisdictions and performing complex services are better for performance. Again, 
this contradicts many of the key premises upon which faith in decentralization is based, such as 
proximity to the local populations.  
 
While there is much normative faith in the Tocquevillian ideal of the proximity of local decision 
making to the locality and its people, there is little evidence that the smaller the local government 
unit, the better will be its performance (Khemani 2004). An important consideration to keep in 
mind is that the “pastoral” (Rubin 2005) over-romanticisation of the small, rural, local unit does 
not square with the reality of high urbanization, including in the less industrialized settings. In 
conflict zones too, formerly rural residents have tended to congregate around urban centres. 
Africa provides a good illustration of this trend. Urban population is estimated to form half of the 
population of the African continent by 2020 (Olowu, Wunsch, and Ayee 2004). This shift will 
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have profound effects on social service and other needs, such as schooling and other forms of 
education, thereby affecting the most appropriate size and policy scope of local governments. 
 
OUTSOURCING 
 
Finally, questions of accountability and performance are linked to the nature of governance (and 
not just government) structures. Studies of municipal service provision (financing) and/ or 
delivery (production) have shown how task-sharing between state, municipal, and private bodies 
and NGOs could lead to positive performance outcomes. Task sharing may have positive 
implications for production and allocative efficiency, cost of delivery, and the extent to which 
local demand is reflected in social services. Competition in service delivery among various 
providers could have implications for greater equity, as it may drive prices down for essential 
services such as water or electricity (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Municipalities alone may 
simply lack the skills, resources, staff, and technical expertise, or indeed the incentive to run 
these services properly. A proper mix of public and private providers could also boost 
performance because of the disciplining nature of citizen mobility between the two sectors 
(Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000).  
 
While such a division of responsibility is inevitable, extreme forms of new public management 
miss out on important distinctions between market contexts in which private business and public 
authorities, respectively, operate (Gyford, Game, and Leach 1989). While in a private 
competitive market, the service provider has direct accountability to the consumer, in what has 
been defined as the “short route of accountability,” in public services delivery, there are two 
major accountability relationships: between politicians’ accountability to citizens, and between 
politicians and service providers, that is, the “long route of accountability.” With 
decentralization, it has been argued, a third link in the chain of accountability is introduced, 
namely central governments. Democratically-elected councils may not hold some service 
providers accountable because they remain formally under the authority of, or employed by, 
national government ministries or agencies (Ahmad et al. 2005).  
 
The complexity of these relationships accounts for mixed performance outcomes in newly 
decentralizing or democratizing settings where national and local legal and policy frameworks 
allowed for greater involvement of the private and/ or NGO sectors. In many post-communist 
states, for example, municipalities have enjoyed discretionary authority over the contracting out 
of social services. Local governments have been able to choose among various service-delivery 
instruments, namely by municipalities, through contracting out, or through grant provision to 
non-profit organizations. The performance record varies from country to country however 
(Lankina, Hudalla, and Wollmann, 2008).  
 
Within the same country, assessments of the record of such public-private sector arrangements 
may also vary. Shah cites Chile as a positive example, where Catholic schools compete with 
public schools for education financing (Shah). Other scholars provide a dissenting voice however 
and argue that the impact of such competitive mechanisms could be mixed. They argue that 
while aspects of education provision improved with devolution, they did not always have the 
expected positive impact on the quality of education. Rural and low-income student performance 
declined while that of pupils from higher income and socio-economic levels improved (Parry 
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1997). This is because of incentives for grade inflation and competition for better students. This 
result is of course discouraging for developing settings where an important rationale behind 
decentralization objectives is poverty reduction and addressing socio-economic disparities.  
 
LEADERSHIP SKILLS 
 
Leadership skills of individual local councillors or executives are often neglected in studies of 
local government performance. Leadership is important for effective lobbying of national 
authorities to mobilize scarce resources. It is also essential for generating consensus on policy 
areas or pushing through a vital developmental agenda. Case studies of local governance in 
various settings have shown how sound leadership could make a difference for local 
performance. Even within the same national setting, where local governments have similar 
institutional arrangements, financial resources, and degree of autonomy from state authorities, 
leadership skills could make some municipalities perform better than others. Usually cross-
national studies of local government neglect this factor because they average out performance for 
local governments in the country. Leadership is also hard to measure, and factoring it in would 
require case study analysis, which might not be always feasible.    
 
One important study that pointed to the role of leadership in affecting local performance is 
Tendler’s work on Brazil (Tendler 1997). In explaining performance in municipalities in two 
states, she highlights the role of state level leadership, which created a “strong sense of ‘calling’ 
and mission” around new programs, boosted by information campaigns, prizes for good 
performance, and wide media publicity of best practice cases (Tendler 1997).  
 
National governments embarking on decentralization in earnest and donors supporting a 
decentralization agenda could play an important role in encouraging good local leadership, 
publicising leadership best practice, and encouraging leadership experience sharing between 
different municipalities. Author interviews with mayors and local councillors in Central and 
Eastern Europe often reveal a strong perception of lack of efficacy: confronted with chronic 
under-funding, under-staffing, and a host of social and economic problems in the locality, local 
functionaries find it all too easy to blame performance weaknesses on these factors (Lankina, 
Hudalla, and Wollmann 2008). Publicising best practice stories of municipalities that face similar 
conditions, but manage to sustain a high level of performance, could help alter perceptions of 
low efficacy and show that individual leadership could make a difference. Local leaders may not 
be able to affect outcomes (effects), but they can certainly make a difference for outputs (actual 
provision of services) (Treisman 2002; Putnam 1993). 
 
ROLE OF BROADER GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND IMPACT OF DONORS 
 
Broader geographical and “neighbourhood” factors also affect local performance in a variety of 
ways. In general, scholars now increasingly recognise the geographic clustering of democratic 
winners and losers. Moreover, performance variations related to aspects of governance (Huther 
and Shah 1998) or that of specific institutions, such as local governments, have also been shown 
to show patterns of geographic clustering (Shah). The causal mechanisms that lead to such 
clustering are hard to discern. Indeed, most explanations of institutional outcomes in a given 
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country are usually sought in domestic variables, such as levels of socio-economic development, 
experience with democracy or decentralization, or dependence on the national government. 
Systematic research into how external factors related to broader regional or international 
environments and targeted donor aid filter into the local level is still in its infancy.  
 
Quantitative data that would make such cross-national research feasible is scarce. The most 
credible and widely used indices compiled or used by such agencies as the World Bank, the IMF, 
or Transparency International, are national level. These data are inadequate for sound analysis of 
local governance because ideally, data for both right hand-side and left-hand side variables 
should be for the sub-national level. For example, if we want to study the impact of donors 
(independent variable) on local performance (dependent variable), then we would need to 
disaggregate data for donor aid into its sub-national components. For the dependent variable, we 
would have to collect data on individual municipalities and their performance. This task is of 
course much more complicated than simply taking aggregate data from statistical agencies or 
other institutions without disaggregating it into data for each municipality. Data availability in 
turn limits the scope of research questions that could be asked. Over two decades into donor-
driven decentralization, and volumes of studies related to it, most cross-national research is still 
done on local government as a whole, and we still do not know how external factors affect local 
governments.  
 
One way of ascertaining the causal mechanisms that lead to geographical clustering of sub-
national performance variations is the “geographic incremental” framework (Lankina and 
Getachew 2006). This framework may be appropriate for decentralized countries whose national-
level politics exhibit authoritarian tendencies, but where “enclaves” of democracy are found in 
sub-national localities. Making the causal link between external factors and local outcomes, 
while including domestic controls, allows for a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of 
local performance, particularly given that in many countries decentralization initiatives are 
external donor driven in the first place. Moreover, such a framework allows to ascertain the 
neighbourhood factor. Not just donors, which may be geographically remote, but also immediate 
“neighbours” could affect local performance either because they provide targeted aid to their 
neighbours, or because they serve as a model—good or, for that matter, bad.  
 
These external factors are also important for addressing questions of local government 
accountability. Accountability is usually assumed to be solely a function of domestic factors. 
Usually it is linked to electoral or appointment-dismissal mechanisms and citizen oversight. 
There are however material forms of accountability, which drive behaviour and performance: 
material rewards could be awarded or withdrawn depending on performance. At the same time, 
there is what may be called “normative accountability.” Mayors or councillors would be more or 
less likely to perceive certain actions as normatively desirable depending on the networks they 
are socialised in, which could in turn influence these perceptions. One study found that localities 
receiving European Union aid and those with mayors sitting on the Council of Europe Congress 
of Regional and Local Authorities were more likely to opt for a democratic form of election of 
city mayors. This was despite the national government efforts to undermine local democracy by 
pushing for appointed local executives (Gel'man and Lankina 2008). Normative accountability 
could make local leaders, who regularly socialize with counterparts in democracies, less prone to 
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engage in some blatantly authoritarian practice. Whether it is indeed the case or not is of course 
an empirical question, but one that merits serious consideration and study. 
 
Ascertaining the precise nature and origin of external influences, be they targeted aid, or other, 
and their impact on local performance would be therefore important for coming to grips with 
what policies or strategies to improve local performance work and what do not. Nuanced cross-
national comparisons of this kind would better interrogate both the premises that are driven by 
unquestionable faith in the appropriateness of donor-driven decentralizations, and those that 
criticise such efforts as being part of a neo-liberal conspiracy of privatization, which ultimately 
undermines local democracy. 
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Measuring and Evaluating Performance 
 
Evaluating and measuring performance has been the thorniest issue of local government studies 
(Clark and Ferguson 1981; Bish and Ostrom 1973; Crook and Manor 1998). Three 
methodological approaches to assessing performance may be identified.  
 
The first one is by studying local public opinion with regard to the level of satisfaction with local 
government, most notably with the degree of its responsiveness (Crook and Manor 1998; Azfar, 
Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001). Responsiveness has been defined as “the capacity of 
governmental organization to satisfy the preferences of citizens.” Proponents of this approach 
argue that it is appropriate because local populations are the main consumers of local services, 
moreover, that they are the “best judges of their own interests” (Bish and Ostrom 1973: 22). This 
approach suffers from a shortcoming in that local public opinion may not be a reliable source for 
evaluating local government performance. This is confirmed in studies of settings as diverse as 
Russia, England, and India. A study of Russia has shown, for example, that local governments 
are often blamed for poor services even if they had no authority over a particular service, which 
may be actually performed by the central state or the regional government (Startsev 1999). Focus 
group studies involving local populations in the United Kingdom have also revealed that local 
people often express opinions regarding municipalities based more on “common sense” or 
prejudice, than on awareness of local policies (Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker 2001: 450). And 
in India, local voters could hold state governments most responsible for essential social services 
even where elected local governments are in place (Ahmad et al. 2005).  
 
A second approach would be to explore consumer satisfaction using a much smaller sample of 
respondents from particular institutions that are either recipients or deliverers of local 
government services or both, be these public or private agencies. An investigation of local 
government employees’ satisfaction with their own work and their views of the issues facilitating 
or hampering local performance could be also included in this research. The consumers of 
economic development programs could be for example enterprise managers. Consumers and 
deliverers of social policies could be staffs and clients of schools, hospitals, homeless shelters, 
foster homes, or NGOs. The local administration respondents would be staffs in local 
government departments in charge of social services.  
 
Using this method, one study, for example, examined service delivery by police, social workers, 
teachers, and small traders. Three sets of actors were interviewed: service providers, such as the 
police and schools; consumers of the respective services; and city leaders (Clark et al. 1981). 
This and similar studies suggest that if the particular policy area is within the scope of a local 
authority, local performance in a particular field could be a reliable indicator of that of local 
government as a whole. While a particular agency or an NGO may be separate from local 
government, it may be still integrated into the local government policy-making process. This is 
because local government service provision decision making, that is, deciding on whether to 
make a service available and to arrange for its delivery, affects the actual production of the 
service by the respective non-local government agencies (Hawkins). A consumer- and provider-
satisfaction approach to specific institutions would also allow for a nuanced perception of the 
diverse factors affecting local services, which may not be revealed in large-scale population 
surveys. Research on urban politics indicates that “reasonably reliable” data could be obtained 
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from interviewing a dozen or so informants (Clark et al. 1981: 34). This method has been used 
together with other methodological instruments in some studies of local government 
performance in essential services in the developing world (Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 
2001; Crook and Manor 1998).  
 
The approach has been also used more generally in studies that ascertain other aspects of local 
government performance, such as its ability to engage the citizenry and enhance local 
participation. Heller and his collaborators used a sample of thirteen key respondents in each of 
the rural panchayats selected randomly for their study of participatory democracy in Kerala. 
Such a method, they argue, is well suited for medium-n studies provided that the range of 
opinions could be maximised. In their case, both members of the ruling and opposition parties 
were surveyed, and the sample was spread across three sectors of government, elected 
representatives, and civil society groups (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007).  
 
A third and related approach, which should complement the latter one, would be to devise 
evaluation criteria for local government “outputs.” This method is commonly used in studies of 
decentralizing settings, with scholars coming up with own measures of outputs, relying on audit 
data, or carrying out household surveys in randomly selected samples of households and/ or 
municipalities (Besley et al.; Khemani 2004; Azfar, Kaehkoenen, and Meagher 2001). The most 
widely cited comprehensive effort at measuring outputs is Putnam’s study of regional reform in 
Italy. Putnam evaluated institutional performance by looking at twelve indicators of policy 
processes (cabinet stability, budget promptness, statistical and information services); policy 
pronouncement (reform legislation, legislative innovation); and policy implementation, or how 
policy translates into specific action (such as building clinics or roads) (Putnam 1993). In-depth 
examination of internal decision making and legislation, surveys with local officials, and with 
the broader electorate, were employed for measuring performance along these dimensions. 
 
This latter “output” approach is also most often employed in cross-national quantitative studies 
of local performance. It may not always be replicable however considering the vast cross-
national differences in data availability and policy contexts. The methodological problems 
inherent in such an approach when applied to different settings have been identified in the 
foregoing discussion. The data are used at very high levels of aggregation, which do not permit a 
nuanced understanding of local realities. Outputs in such analyses could well arguably be 
outcomes, beyond the authority or influence of local governments. And causality is often 
unclear. While such studies provide valuable insights into broader patterns of influences on local 
performance, they should be regarded as a first step in the analysis, and should be followed by 
nuanced case-by case and policy-by policy exploration of the drivers of local performance. 
 
Whichever approach is taken, comparative service evaluation is a complicated task, because 
service-providing systems are different in each country. As Bird and Yilmaz write with regard to 
measuring the effects of decentralization in general, “if one cannot be confident of measuring the 
independent variable, then one cannot state with much confidence that decentralization is 
associated with one or more outcomes” (Yilmaz 2002). In one state a given service area may be 
the exclusive responsibility of local government, while in others it may be shared between 
different levels, or is the exclusive task of the meso, regional, level, or the central government. 
Moreover, in recent years many countries have experienced a decentralist shift not just between 
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different levels of public authority, but also between the public and private, or non-for profit 
sectors. In some Central European countries, such as Hungary, for example, the central 
government requires NGOs to maintain contracts with municipalities as a precondition for 
allocating municipal grants. Cooperation between public and  private agencies becomes an 
important factor that determines availability of central funding, and ultimately the quality of 
local social service provision (Osborne and Kaposvari 1998).  
 
Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird provide a list of possible combinations of how local services could be 
produced or provided. A combination of central, local, and regional authorities could be in 
charge of providing services in one policy area, or they could be provided fully or in part by the 
public sector, while being produced by the private sector, or produced and provided by private 
actors. These combinations will vary by sector or even by local government within the same 
country, not to mention that they will vary substantially across countries (Litvack, Ahmad, and 
Bird 1998). Moreover, formal arrangements may be the same in two countries, but other 
institutions, political factors, or informal practices would make their actual functioning vastly 
different. 
 
The above discussion illustrates the complexities involved in performance measurement and 
evaluation. In different states or even municipalities within one national setting the degree of 
public versus non-public agency involvement may be different (Helgason 1997; Bennett 1994; 
Hatry 1994; Sevic 2003). It is also important to bear in mind that local authorities may have to 
balance between distinct groups of policy choices, such as development, redistribution, and 
routine local services (Wong 1989). Prioritizing one policy area  might come at the expense of 
quality performance in others. 
 
Public services measurement instruments designed for a particular urban setting may be also 
inappropriate in others and may yield unreliable or distorted results. For example, similar 
production inputs my result in quite different outputs in an area with different characteristics, 
such as a sewage system which may be much more costly in hilly as opposed to flat areas (Bish 
and Ostrom 1973). Likewise, corporate style benchmarking may not be an appropriate evaluation 
tool: municipalities may provide similar services, but their quality may vary. Even if service 
quality may be good in one area, not all residents may have access to the respective facilities. 
This would be the case with healthcare if we use the criteria of the number of hospitals in a 
locality. Variation in the availability of facilities to all residents makes measurement of service 
quality difficult (Gottdiener 1987). Governments may also locate clinics in areas where health 
had been good in any case, thereby leading researchers to overstate the impact of such clinics 
(Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000). 
 
Another example of measurement complexities is trying to evaluate the effects of variable fiscal 
policy choices. Such choices might be assessed quite differently depending on citizen 
preferences. Redistributive policies or the imposition of protective social safety nets may have a 
positive effect on the well being of socially disadvantaged populations. These policies may also 
drive businesses out of the city, however and this might negatively affect the local economy 
(Peterson 1981).  
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Finally, it is important to bear in mind that local governments do have limits. They are parts of 
wider regional and national political, institutional, and socio-economic contexts. Their 
shortcomings may therefore to a greater or lesser extent also depend on these broader structural 
or political factors outside of their control (Peterson 1981). A nuanced examination of local 
performance should be sensitive to the variable local or broader contexts in which municipalities 
operate, and the complexity of the local policy choices that they face. 
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Discussion, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 
A complex array of factors shape local accountability and performance. The preceding sections 
have identified key factors discussed in the literature on local government performance and 
decentralization more generally. They are the broader political and economic environments in 
which local governments operate; voice through elections and oversight; the scope and nature of 
local government powers vis-à-vis the national or regional governments and fiscal 
decentralization; peculiarities of local political cultures; ethno-social fragmentation of a given 
community; the size of the administrative unit; the precise policy areas that local governments 
are in charge of; the nature of national and local party systems; the structure of local government; 
outsourcing mechanisms that are in place; leadership skills; broader external neighbourhood or 
other factors, as well as donor involvement. There is a general consensus that all of these factors 
matter for local performance. Much of the disagreement in the literature is precisely how the 
peculiarities of each of the dimensions identified above shape local performance, as indeed the 
particular mix of the above dimensions. Are smaller local jurisdictions better than larger ones? Is 
local authority over education and healthcare more conducive to good performance than when 
these areas are within the exclusive authority of central state bodies? Are strong party systems 
and party presence in the councils conducive to local accountability? What about settings that 
might have various combinations of the above factors? What mix is the most appropriate? 
 
Furthermore, empirical research in different or even the same national setting(s) often results in 
completely opposite findings or interpretations. While some scholars regard Chile as a paragon 
of performance in local education, others point to substantial problems with it, such as a negative 
impact on access to quality education by the socially-disadvantaged groups. The reason for such 
disagreements is the multi-dimensional nature of local performance and factors affecting it. All 
of the factors identified above should be considered together in order to make sound judgement 
about what drives local performance. The reality is however that often studies that focus on 
participatory aspects of local performance neglect policy outputs and the quality of essential 
services; while those that focus on service efficiency may neglect the extent to which the public 
had been involved in designing the policy and could hold policy makers accountable. The 
champions of party presence in local councils may neglect the wider socio-economic and inter-
governmental factors. These contextual influences might subvert the accountability and 
“linkage” function of party systems. 
 
Some general conclusions could be nevertheless derived from the literature review. They point to 
“ideal-type” situations that may not be fully present in the localities, but could serve as material 
for generating hypotheses for further research.  
 
On balance, decentralization, when factors discussed in this paper are taken into account, could 
have a positive effect on democratic accountability and performance. If a country is still in the 
process of local government reform, hyper-decentralization should be avoided, and the 
administrative size of the unit, that is, the territory and population that its jurisdiction would 
cover, should be considered carefully. Even in the “perfect” conditions of an industrialized 
ethnically homogenous democracy, devolving too much policy and taxation authority to local 
governments could result in low performance outcomes for reasons related to “technicity,” 
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“externability,” and “chargeability.” In the extreme opposite case of underdeveloped, 
undemocratic, and ethnically- and socially-stratified community, such hyper-decentralization 
could be prone to enclavization, exacerbation of extant socio-economic inequalities, and poor 
services.  
 
Internal institutional design of an (ideally) medium-size local authority should give careful 
consideration to balance between the political and technocratic side of local government. A 
popularly elected and accountable chief executive or an appointed city manager should wield 
sufficient power to push though developmental or other policy agenda, but should be also held in 
check by the local council. At the same time, while upward accountability of the executive arm 
of the administration is inevitable in some policy areas, it should be avoided for local councils. 
Legislation targeting the inclusion of under-represented groups could help address the problem 
of the colonization of councils by those accountable to higher bureaucracies, traditional, or 
patrimonial leaders. Legal mechanisms should be in place ensuring that the chief executive is not 
simultaneously accountable to higher bureaucracies. While party presence in local councils, 
which could be ensured through proportional representation, could serve an important 
accountability-enhancing and linkage function, it may not be desirable because it helps 
proliferate “veto players.” Furthermore, in countries with a tradition of a strong link between 
national parties and politics, where parties have weak roots in society, and where a record of 
civic cooperation and cross-cutting cleavages are absent, party presence in local governments 
would encourage patronage. 
 
The policy scope should be realistic, with only basic services reserved for small- to medium-size 
local governments in less developed contexts during the initial years after local governments had 
been set up. At the same time, officials performing these basic functions should be accountable 
to the local authorities. When these officials are also accountable to line ministries or other 
higher bureaucratic structures, the lines of accountability to the respective authorities should be 
clear. The policy scope could be expanded over the years, once public administration reform and 
training of local authorities had occurred. Substantial field research into local government 
performance of this author in various national contexts suggests that local governments in small- 
to medium-size localities are not desperate to take on complex policy areas. Assigning realistic 
policy spheres will only enhance local efficacy. At the same time, it is prudent to provide local 
authorities with sufficient authority and taxation powers at the margins to create incentives for 
local economic promotion. Again, empirical evidence suggests that few resources could be 
required, with leadership skills and innovation going a long way to make a difference for the 
locality.  
 
Effective public scrutiny mechanisms should be in place to monitor local government 
performance. This is another reason why size matters. Local government units that are larger in 
size will also have a greater diversity and quality of independent press outlets. Having one main 
local newspaper funded and run by the local administration is an unacceptable form of public 
scrutiny. Special structures of oversight, which have proven their effectiveness, such as 
participatory budgeting, vigilance committees, and ombudsmen, should be put in place. In less 
developed settings with high socio-economic inequalities, targeted measures should be adopted 
aimed at reducing information and resource asymmetries and thereby involving even the 
marginalised social groups in scrutiny and participation. Regular visitations by local government 
 45 
authorities should be organised to villages or towns forming part of the larger administrative unit 
of local government jurisdiction. Public discussion meetings of the kind that exist in India’s state 
of Kerala should be organised at regular intervals. And public transportation should be in place 
for the poor to travel to the seat of the local authority.  
 
Outsourcing or other form of services co-production should be encouraged provided that the co-
producing agencies could be held partly or fully accountable by the local authorities. National 
government funding for such co-producing schemes should go through the local authorities, 
which could then have discretion over, and allocate funding, on a competitive basis. This would 
help improve the accountability chain involving local clients and service providers. Councils 
should be able to hold NGOs or private bodies accountable for their services, and could be in 
turn held accountable by the local citizenry for the service delivery provider choices that they 
make. At the same time, general and discretionary national grant making to the localities should 
be transparent, and should be publicised widely in the local media. This would allow the 
monitoring of potential patronage, or consistent under-allocation of funds to some localities at 
the expense of others, in turn allowing voters to hold national policy makers accountable.      
  
Sceptical voices notwithstanding, donors or other external actors could play a strong and positive 
role in nurturing structures of local accountability and performance. This support could take 
anything from training of local officials, to support for independent media outlets, to publicising 
best practice cases or giving awards to effective local leaders.    
 
The first set of key hypotheses based on a discussion of the more optimal scenarios, would then 
be as follows: 
 
Medium size municipalities, with authority over basic, less complex services; with non-mobile 
assets power of taxation and transparent and stable revenue allocations from national or regional 
governments; with popularly elected local executives or council appointed managers; with clear 
lines of downward and upward accountability of the executive arm of local government; with 
councillors that do not have strong dual structures of bureaucratic or patrimonial accountability; 
with councils that are not elected based on proportional representation, but reserve seats for 
disadvantaged socio-economic groups; with structures of oversight, with innovative services co-
production schemes involving NGOs and private bodies accountable to local governments, will 
perform better than those where either all or any of these above conditions are absent. 
 
A second set of hypotheses relating to wider political and socio-economic environments, which 
should be incorporated as controls in devising comparative studies of performance, would be as 
follows: 
 
The longer the country has been a democracy; the higher its overall level of economic 
development; the lower the level of corruption in the country as a whole; the less ethnically- and 
socially-fragmented a particular locality in question; the greater the tradition of participatory 
political culture and civic engagement; the closer it is to democratic neighbours; the more aid it 
receives specifically targeting local government development; the greater the likelihood of good 
performance.  
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Despite the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the above hypotheses, they are testable using 
both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The research design for the quantitative dimension 
of a study testing the above hypotheses would involve selecting municipalities based on the size 
of the unit, for example, roughly 50,000-100,000 people. Another sample would include 
municipalities of a smaller size, to test counter-hypotheses. Data for each municipality, or, absent 
substantial within-nation variations, for each country, would be gathered. The data would cover 
authority over services; outsourcing; manner of election or selection of local executive; whether 
the executive and councillors have dual structures of bureaucratic or patrimonial accountability; 
whether the council is elected based on proportional representation or not; or whether seats are 
reserved for disadvantaged socio-economic groups. Variations within this sample would then be 
examined using the controls as specified above.  
 
For the dependent variable, measures for outputs for the particular localities in the sample would 
be employed. Ideally, they would include both policies which are mandated, and those that are 
more discretionary and are better indicators of innovativeness, such as economic promotion. In-
depth “consumer and provider satisfaction” interviews with key local actors, as well as field 
research in a select group of either “most similar,” or “most different” localities would 
accompany the study to facilitate further generalizations (Przeworski and Teune 1982). In highly 
socially- and economically-stratified or ethnically-fragmented settings, particular care would be 
given to studying potential asymmetries in who benefits from local policies. This would allow to 
address the methodological problem of having broader indicators for the performance of the 
locality as a whole, while not identifying how members of particular groups might be excluded 
from the benefits of a certain policy. 
 
Such a methodology would contrast with the vast majority of extant cross-national quantitative 
studies of local government performance, which either lump together all municipalities, or even 
state authorities in federal states, or do not seek variation within the sample of municipalities of a 
particular size. Because data would be gathered for individual municipalities as well, it would 
allow to uncover within-nation variations and would therefore provide a more nuanced 
understanding of both the contextual and locality-specific drivers of local performance.  
 
Data requirements for such an undertaking would be considerable. And yet, the compilation of 
cross-national micro-data on sub-national levels of authority is long overdue. An important 
reason for the fixation of many of even the most sophisticated studies on the national level or 
high levels of aggregation on sub-national levels is that data availability drives research 
questions and methods. When conducting large-n cross-national studies related to democracy, 
economic development, or decentralization, scholars inevitably have to rely on credible and 
established indices, such as those compiled by the World Bank, the IMF or other reputable 
institutions, the most widely used data for fiscal decentralization being the IMF Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS) and Freedom House, Polity, and World Bank indicators for democracy 
and governance. These data are mostly national level.  
 
Not only are such indices or ratings widely used because they are based on expert data that is as 
solid and reliable as it gets, but also because they include annual adjustments. They are therefore 
an invaluable source for temporal analysis. Nevertheless, there are pitfalls involved in reliance 
on such data. The year-by-year country data reduce the number of observations, thereby limiting 
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what one can do with it statistically. Actors or processes that are not captured by annual data 
become “blind spots,” left out of the analysis. And most importantly for this analysis, by 
averaging out country-wide data, they fail to capture within-nation variations. These variations 
may be enormous in territorially-large countries, but also smaller ones with high regional socio-
economic disparities (Munck and Snyder 2007).  
 
While the scholarly and policy community has long shifted its focus from the national to lower 
levels of authority given the global decentralization trend, data availability has not caught up 
with this trend. The few studies that have come up with own data on local performance report the 
challenges involved in working with local data. Data, particularly in developing settings, tend to 
be old or incomplete, or otherwise unusable for analysis because of low administrative capacity 
for record keeping or simple lack of time because of focus on addressing other pressing problems 
(Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Local councils often fail to record expenditures properly, or 
one municipality’s record keeping may not be comparable with that of another one, even within 
the same country. Moreover, a rather perverse sense of secrecy characterises some 
municipalities, particularly in post-authoritarian settings, or those that often do have something 
to hide. This author was denied access to stenographic records of some local governments in 
Russia, and had to go through enormous lengths to obtain data related to budgeting in another 
one. The attempts of individual scholars to uncover the drivers of local performance are 
commendable however the methods are bound to be crude given the lack of data. The sheer 
enormity of the data-gathering effort for each local authority restricts the sample to only a few 
countries or cases. Only if and when cross-national data on municipal levels of authority are 
available, could more comprehensive and refined assessments of the drivers of local performance 
be made. Some scholars, like Treisman, have gone a long way to bridge this data gap by coming 
up with own local government indices. Nevertheless, even Treisman’s data do not allow to 
uncover within-nation variations in municipal set-up, structures of accountability, ethnic 
fragmentation, or other variables at the level of individual localities. Against this background, the 
World Bank Decentralization Thematic Group’s project to merge cross-country data collection 
efforts for establishing a comprehensive database of fiscal and institutional variables is an 
important step forward (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). 
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